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ABSTRACT

A NARRATIVE OF UNCERTAIN INTENT:
COMMUNICATION ETHICS AND FBI COUNTERTERRORISM PRACTICES

By
Hannah Karolak
May 2018

Dissertation supervised by Ronald C. Arnett
This project works in the horizon of one driving question: What value does
communication ethics bring to counterterrorism practices in this current moment?
Following insights of communication ethics scholars that have come before, this work
understands communication ethics as practices that yield social literacy about what
matters to an other. This work adds to communication ethics scholarship the following
finding: When applied to current and future events, communication ethics literacy affords
one a lens for opening and sustaining spaces for creative communicative
response. Through five chapters—which work in tandem to perform an application of
communication ethics literacy to the current and ongoing practices of FBI
counterterrorism—this project finds that what one ends up with is not solution-based
answers, but reflective communicative practices that sustain counter responses to

iv

terrorism. These reflective practices, performed with attentiveness to communication
ethics literacy, validate the importance of communications ethics for thinking about and
responding to terrorism. Communication ethics literacy affords professionals a lens for
exploring the questions that shape counterterrorism. And while this application does not
provide answers for the demands that terrorism places on professionals in this historical
moment, it provides meaningful assistance for navigating threats in a manner that does
justice to the diverse nation it seeks to protect. In this moment where solution-based
answers are not an attainable reality, and the demands of terrorism are ongoing, reflective
communicative practices offer a space for learning and adapting to challenges in realtime.
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Chapter 1: National Security through the Ages: Shaping Counterterrorism
This project works in the horizon of one driving question: What value does
communication ethics bring to counterterrorism practices in this current moment? This
driving question shapes additional considerations regarding communication ethics and
counterterrorism. For instance, how does communication ethics assist in navigating
counterterrorism practices; and, how can professionals engage counterterrorism in
reflection of communication ethics? Counterterrorism practices and procedures assist the
security community in navigating the increasing demands that terrorism presents to our
country. These methods for preventing and responding to attacks work within a
framework committed to a singular goal—to keep the nation safe. This project explores
counterterrorism from the vantage point of communication ethics asking: can the literacy
of communication ethics provide assistance? This work attends to two basic and
grounding assumptions regarding communication ethics and counterterrorism: (1) the
literacy of communication ethics serves as an interpretive lens, allowing us to discover
new hermeneutic openings for research and development; and (2) terrorism is foreground
violence fueled by competing background goods—terrorism is an ongoing phenomenon
with multiple sources. This project argues that communication ethics as interpretive lens
offers a pragmatic first step1 to navigating counterterrorism responses in the 21st century.
The work recognizes the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 as a turning point in the
organization of national security policy and counterterrorism in the United States. As a
significant story that transformed the narrative of counterterrorism, 9/11 continues to
shape our communicative response to counterterrorism. Due to the range and scope of
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Ronald C. Arnett, “The Fulcrum Point of Dialogue: Monologue, Worldview, and Acknowledgement,”
The American Journal of Semiotics 28, no. ½ (2012): 105–127.
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counterterrorism research and practices, this project will identify one area of this large
study that will serve as a catalyst for future research. Particularly, this work will explore
the role of the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) in combatting terrorism. In order to
(1) situate the FBI in the area of national security and counter terrorism within the U.S.,
and (2) to provide a context for the current organization of national security offices
following 9/11, the beginning of this project will provide a historical context of American
national security. This work understands communication ethics as historically situated,
therefore, by offering an account of national security prior to the 9/11 attacks. This
beginning chapter provides a backdrop against which counterterrorism practices can be
explored.
Introduction
Communication ethics involves practices that yield social literacy about what
matters to an other.2 When applied to social artifacts, the literacy of communication
ethics provides a lens for collecting, interpreting, and making sense out of data. In this
moment, the U.S. faces a unique threat as terrorism continues to present security
professionals with demanding challenges to national security. The challenges resulting
from terrorism are both complex and dynamic. As professionals develop means to
respond to threats, new challenges arise. Thus, efforts are ongoing in the fight against
terrorism. In response to this challenge, this project begins with the assumption that
communication ethics can assist researchers in navigating the post-9/11 terrains of
counterterrorism practices by broadening the scope of counterterrorism research and

2

François Cooren, Action and Agency in Dialogue: Passion, Incarnation, and Ventriloquism. (Amsterdam:
John Benjamins Publish Co., 2010).
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opening new avenues for creative response. Creative response, which, this work argues,
is made possible by active and continued reflective communicative practices, prevents
terrorism from achieving its aim of crippling persons to inaction through violence and
fear. These reflective communicative practices are shaped by attentiveness to
communication ethics. Communication ethics, in this project, articulates the goods that
persons are willing to die for in order to secure; questions concerning the importance of
these goods in our current historical moment, as well as the communicative practices
used to protect these goods, demand our attention.
This project begins not from a critical stance, but with an openness to learning
from and about the complexities of counterterrorism in this moment. As I engage
communication ethics scholarship alongside documented FBI counterterrorism practices
and procedures, this work will continually ask the following questions: (1) What are the
emerging limitations to practices and research? (2) What touch points between these two
areas of research exist? (3) Are there additional hermeneutic openings for engagement?
These questions shape this project as both exploratory and practical in this attempt to
bridge theory and practice in a way that offers pragmatic steps for future insights.
Reflecting upon these questions, this project frames creative response with attentiveness
to the following definition of creativity: “The faculty of being creative; ability or power
to create.”3 This definition highlights ability as a key aspect of creativity. As such,
creative response rests on a capacity to create rather than on the creation of specific
goods. The hope, then, of this project is to speak to the ability of communications ethics

3

This definition comes from the Oxford English Dictionary. Merriam Webster defines creativity in a
similar manner: The ability to create.
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literacy to open and maintain the capacity to create communicative openings when
confronted with complex and ongoing challenges. Regarding counterterrorism, this hope
for creativity rests on the capacity to open spaces for response in the face of violence
seeking to overrun these spaces with fear and uncertainty.
Over the course of five chapters, this work will bring a communication ethics lens
to FBI counterterrorism practices. Chapter one, “National Security through the Ages:
Shaping Counterterrorism,” provides insights on the history of U.S. national security in
order to shift our focus of attention away from national security as an objective end goal
toward national security as the ever-evolving challenges and demands that shape our
security demands and responses. Of primary concern for this project, this chapter shows
that national security responds to the needs of a given moment. As leaders interpret
emerging threats, the narratives, goods, and practices that define national security shift.
Additionally, this opening chapter begins to shape the story of 9/11 as one with a rich and
diverse history. Chapter two, “Communication and Competing Backgrounds: The
Interruption of 9/11,” presents the 9/11 terror attacks as both a turning point in American
national security practices and a significant story that continues to shape our narratives of
national security. This chapter acknowledges that stories guide one’s engagement with
the historical moment and offer appropriate grounds for responding to current existential
demands. Of particular importance for this project, chapter two engages September 11 as
story for guiding our engagement with counterterrorism in this particular moment.
Chapter three, “Communication Ethics: The Importance of Being Literate,” addresses one
significant question: Why communication ethics? While the literacy of communication
ethics is used in a preliminary fashion throughout the first two chapters, chapter three
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vets the significance of communication ethics literacy for this project. Chapter three
argues that communication ethics assists counterterrorism professionals by providing an
interpretive lens through which security professionals can better identify the
commitments, motivators, and aims of terrorists. Regarding this project as a whole,
chapter three reviews communication ethics literature and presents the dialogic approach
to communication ethics, which frames this project’s interpretive lens. Chapter four,
“Communicative Context: Counterterrorism in this Historical Moment,” presents
counterterrorism in our historical moment by framing the current communicative context
of counterterrorism. To identify the practical and significant contributions that
communication ethics makes to counterterrorism and the FBI, this chapter identifies the
emerging questions and demands regarding counterterrorism. For the purposes of this
project, this chapter recognizes that with knowledge of the communicative context, we
can address the challenges of terrorism with tools and practices that are grounded in
current context, capabilities, and limitations. This chapter also begins to frame the
application portion of this project by establishing specific areas in FBI counterterrorism
practices that can benefit from a communication ethics lens. The purpose of this chapter
is to offer the FBI as a key artifact in the battle against terrorism in this moment. As a key
artifact, this chapter becomes an exemplar of how the literacy of communication ethics
can sustain creative opportunities for new avenues of practice. The fifth and final chapter
of this work offers pragmatic first steps in the future of counter-terrorism research and
development in the case of the FBI’s defense against domestic terrorism. Using the
communicative context of counterterrorism situated within our current historical moment
as a guide, this chapter offers connections between communication ethics metaphors and
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counterterrorism. This chapter recognizes the importance of narrative for continued
intelligence work while acknowledging that navigating narrative in this era is a difficult
task. Chapter five, “Communication Ethics Literacy as Lens: Responsiveness,
Imagination, and Creativity,” finds that what we end up with are not answers, but
communicative practices for sustaining our counter response to terrorism. These
practices, built with attentiveness to communication ethics literacy, offer genuine hope in
the face of violence and fear perpetrated by terrorists. Engaging the demands that shape
our moment requires a commitment to strive for imagination that fuels creativity. These
recommended practices validate the importance of communications ethics for thinking
about and responding to the phenomenon that is terrorism.
The overall objectives of this project are as follows: This project situates terrorism
and counterterrorism within the broader context of U.S. national security interests and
challenges; This project presents terrorism as a conflict characterized by a
communication ethics gestalt of foreground violence fueled by competing background
sentiments; This work analyzes the Bureau’s practices for countering domestic terrorism
efforts within the United States with the purpose of showing how communication ethics
assists in finding new insights into this area; Through the lens of communication ethics,
this project offers pragmatic next steps for groups charged with responding to and
countering terrorism. As a whole, this work finds pragmatic significance in bridging the
theory of communication ethics literacy with practical processes and procedures for
addressing terrorism. This feat is made with attentiveness to the complexities of our
current historical moment as hypertextual (in which the goods of multiple historical eras
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are copresent) and in response to complexities of counterterrorism as diverse and
unending. The first of these objectives guides this proposal.
Communication ethics scholars Arnett, Fritz, and Bell remind us that ethics are
performed, defended, and practiced in response to that which has come before; this
project also understands communication ethics as historically and contextually attentive.4
For this reason, this chapter will situate current practices of U.S. national security against
a broad historical backdrop. This project is attentive to communication ethics metaphors
articulated in the work of Ronald C. Arnett, Pat Arneson and Leeanne Bell in their article,
“Communication Ethics: The Dialogic Turn,” and Arnett, Janie Harden Fritz and Bell in
their text Communication Ethics Literacy.5 These works provides a literacy of
communication ethics through particular metaphors discussed at length in later chapters.
However, in this chapter, the metaphors of narrative and communicative goods are
particularly important.
Communication ethics metaphors offer one a “fuzzy clarity” of interpretation that
resists attempts to control research with exact definitions. As such, metaphors act as a
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Ronald C. Arnett, Janie Harden Fritz, Leeanne M. Bell, Communication Ethics Literacy: Dialogue and
Difference (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2009).
5
Ronald C. Arnett, Pat Arneson, and Leeanne M. Bell, “Communication Ethics: The Dialogic Turn,”
Review of Communication 6, no. 1/2 (2006): 62–92. Arnett, Arneson, and Bell articulate each of the six
approaches to the study of communication ethics, explaining that four of the approaches function as
prescriptive approaches, or approaches that view the study of communication ethics as prescribing right and
wrong action, one of the approaches function as descriptive, or approaches that seek to describe the ethics
being protected and promoted. Finally, the sixth approach, the dialogic approach, is presented as a counter
to both prescriptive and descriptive approaches. The dialogic approach is attentive to postmodernity as an
era rich with diversity. The following four approaches function as prescriptive and were first presented by
James Chesebro (1) The universal-humanitarian approach, (2) the democratic approach, (3) the codes,
processes and procedure approach, and (4) the contextual approach. The fifth approach, the narrative
approach, functions as descriptive and was identified with the work of Arnett. (See James Chesebro, “A
Construct for Assessing Ethics in Communication,” Central States Speech Journal 20 (1969): 104-114;
Ronald C. Arnett, “The Status of Communication Ethics Scholarship in Speech Communication Journals,
1915–1985,” Central States Speech Journal, 38 (1987): 44–61.) The final approach, the dialogic approach,
is an alternative to prescriptive and descriptive approaches.
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literacy for texturing our understanding of communicative events.6 These metaphors
allow one to see differently; or, see beyond what is initially apparent. Communication
ethics metaphors transform our efforts to explore events to find the what is, to explore
events with the hope of finding what could be. The following paragraphs offer
introductory remarks on the metaphors of narrative and communicative goods. As noted
above, these metaphors will be discussed at length in subsequent chapters.
Narratives frame our communicative response to the demands that call us in a
given moment. As noted by Arnett, narrative houses the persons, stories, and events that
provide meaning to the communicative practices we embody and perform.7 Additionally,
narratives shape and uncover the things that matter most; the communicative goods we
protect and promote. Communicative goods, as understood by Arnett, Fritz, and Bell
depict what matters to particular persons, places, and organizations. Communicative
goods are that which persons protect and promote at all costs. In this project,
communication ethics is characterized by the protection and promotion of particular
communicative goods situated in particular narratives.8 These communicative goods have
two components. First, communicative goods reflect the substantive good protected and
promoted. Second, communicative goods are protected and promoted in real time by
communicative practices. The communicative practices component of goods
characterizes communication ethics as pragmatic and responsive; communicative
practices are embodied and performed in a given moment in response to a given situation.

6

Arnett, Fritz, and Bell, Communication Ethics Literacy, xx.
Ronald C. Arnett, “The Fulcrum Point of Dialogue: Monologue, Worldview, and Acknowledgement” The
American Journal of Semiotics 28, no. ½ (2012): 105–127.
8
Arnett, Fritz, and Bell, Communication Ethics Literacy, 3.
7
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Communicative goods provide clarity of communicative practices of a given
person or organization. Thus, acknowledging the goods in action during a communicative
event provides a backdrop for understanding. To that end, within the following historical
overview of U.S. national security, the communicative goods protected during each time
period will be identified. This historical overview presents national security as
characterized by leadership who define the goods of a country at a given time; evolving
as a result of the changing landscape of politics; and, shaped by the needs a given public
at a specific time. Announcing these goods of multiple time periods reveals how national
security reflects and responds to the needs of a given communicative environment.
Therefore, the communicative goods that shape national security practices will be
acknowledged at the end of each subsection.
National Security in the United States: Overview & Trends
This section identifies major coordinates of the history of U.S. national security.
Following the insights of seminal works in the area of U.S. foreign policy and national
security studies, this section presents the historical backdrop of national security through
the key events that shaped this policy over time. This section begins by discussing
security in early American history leading to the 1941 attacks on Pearl Harbor. Next, this
section overviews national security during World War II and covers U.S. security
following the 1947 National Security Act. Finally, this section overviews security
challenges resulting from the Cold War. The objective of this section is to present a
contextualized view of the national security challenges that emerge from the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001.

9

While a formal policy of national security in the U.S. did not begin until the 1947
National Security Act, the decades leading up to and following the American Revolution
set a precedent for how Americans dealt with foreign relations and challenges. During
this period, a policy of isolationism9 developed. Following the Pearl Harbor attacks and
subsequent entry of the U.S. into World War II, national security was formalized in the
U.S. The attacks at Pearl Harbor proved that a policy of isolationism was no longer
practical in a world with advanced technology. In response to the failure of isolationism,
a policy of containment was established. These turning points in the policy of national
security will be discussed in the following sections. Within this section, these policies
will be textured by significant historical events that shaped the trends and changes of
security policy over time.
Security: Early American History-World War I
In the following paragraphs, national security in early America will be presented
using the work of William O. Walker, professor of history and international relations as
Florida International University. Walker’s research explores early U.S. national security
working to identify the threads of security challenges leading to the Cold War. Within
this section, additional scholarly voices will texture Walker’s story as needed.
In the years leading to and following the American Revolution, security was
characterized by two components: First, with the goal of establishing America as an
independent power, leaders of the Colonies bridged the relationship between security and
economics; Second, following the war for independence, leaders witnessed challenges

9

Isolationism is a policy of excluding one’s country from international affairs. This policy attempts to
protect one’s country from foreign entanglements and conflict. For a discussion of isolationism, see Eric A.
Nordlinger, Isolationism Reconfigured (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995).
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and responses to the civil liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and recognized a close
connection between the security of the nation and the social atmosphere of its citizens.
During the American Revolution (1765–1783), leaders “hoped to provide security
through a political economy of expansion and commerce,”10 and while this sentiment of
economic security was challenged during the early years of America, it was maintained
through the mid 19th century. By the mid to late 1800’s, the industrial revolution and
modernization of industry secured the relationship between security and economic
stability in the U.S. and abroad.11 While economic security secured the future of
America, the importance of unity between and among states was also necessary to secure
the country as a whole. Challenges to the founding documents of the U.S. from individual
states and citizen groups arose as early the Civil War, and these challenges carried over to
the 20th century with civil rights activism. While many events during this period in
American history contributed to the particular challenges the nation faced, this project
focuses on The French and Indian War (1756–1763), the American Civil War, and the
social environment before and after World War I as significant events that shaped a
policy of national security during this time period prior to 1941. Therefore, in the
following paragraphs, a brief discussion of these events will elucidate the on-going
tension in discussions of liberty versus security, the mergence of private security as a
national force, and the strengthening of isolationism as a security tactic.
The French and Indian War, also known as the Seven Years War, established a
sentiment of revolution among colonists. Prior to the Revolutionary war, colonists,

10

William O Walker, National Security and Core Values in American History (New York: Cambridge
University Press. 2009), 43.
11
As is witnessed through work of Thomas Paine, who in 1776 published Common Sense, and Adam
Smith, who in the same year published The Wealth of Nations.
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having linked security to economic stability, worked to enter and exert control over lands
occupied by Native Americans. Attempts to expand into these lands led to the French and
Indian War as military forces under the direction of George Washington attempted to
disperse the French out of the Ohio Valley. Following Great Britain’s victory in this war,
the imperial leash of British control over the colonies tightened. An increase in colonial
taxes was imposed specifically in response to this conflict, and the Royal Proclamation
was signed.
The Royal Proclamation formally ended the French and Indian War and gave
French land in the colonies to Great Britain. It prevented colonists from claiming land
west of the Appalachia and limited colonists from expanding into Indian lands. Yet,
colonists and Great Britain paid little respect to the Proclamation, and dispossession, or
the forcing out of their homelands, of Native Americans by Great Britain and the
colonists followed. This dispossession continued until 1876 when two important treaties
were signed—Hard Labor and Fort Stanwix.12 These Treaties redefined the boundaries of
Great Britain land and Native American land and attempted, finally, to calm relations
between these two groups and their allies by stressing the importance of respect for the
Proclamation. Following the Treaties, colonists identified Native Americans as a threat to
their security, which was tied directly to economic interest through land expansion. This
sentiment carried on into the Revolutionary War until the Battle of Fallen Timbers in
1794.

12

The Treaty of Hard Labor was signed by Great Britain and representatives of the Cherokee Indians to
verify that land south and east of a line running from Fort Stanwix to the Allegheny River was ceded by
American Indians and open to European expansion.
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When, as mentioned above, Great Britain attempted to strengthen their imperial
rule of the colonies and rebuild funds spent during the French and Indian War by
imposing and increasing taxes, the colonies began a formal rejection of Great Britain’s
intentions. Colonists, having “linked. . . political economy of trade and development with
their security,” rejected the taxes and the increased control imposed by Great Britain.13
Worrying about the aftermath of the French and Indian War, Benjamin Franklin
expressed in a 1755 letter to the Governor of Pennsylvania that “those who would give up
essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty or
Safety.”14 With the imperial leash tightened, the colonies further recognized their need
for independence on a social, political, and economic front.
Prior to the American Revolutionary War, colonists recognized that freedom from
Great Britain’s rule would secure the colonies as an independent political entity and
economy. Following the Revolutionary War, a remaining British presence in the colonies
threatened the security of new America. It was not until the Jay Treaty of 1795 that this
threat lessened.15 Close to this same time, the Articles of Confederation placed power
within and among the 13 sovereign states. Yet, class conflicts led to public outcry against
the articles in the form of protests and rebellions (Shay’s Rebellion and Whiskey
Rebellion, for example).16
Once independence was won, leaders of the country recognized the importance of
unity among states and the need for both public and private systems of security. As

13

Walker, National Security and Core Values in American History, 16.
Ibid., 19.
15
Ibid., 24.
16
Ibid., 26. Shay’s Rebellions occurred in 1786 and 1787 when groups of farmers publically protested the
enforcement of local and national taxes. The Whiskey Rebellion occurred in 1791 as protestors resisted the
“Whiskey Tax” imposed by the national government.
14
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leaders worked to quell threats to unity through law—for example, John Adams in 1798
approved strengthening the navy and supported Alien and Sedition Acts, which silenced
oppression17—the need for private forms of security was recognized as dissent to these
laws resulted in private contempt of law on a local scale. Additionally, as a newly formed
nation, the U.S. recognized the need to suppress international conflicts, which threatened
free trade and the economic stability of the county.
Following the War of 1812, The Missouri Compromise of 1820 delineated a line
in American soil limiting the spread of slavery from South to North. As slaves began to
be transferred illegally into free territories via the Underground Railroad, slave owners
began hiring private investigators to find and return escaped persons.18 Regarding
security, disputes between and among persons and state leaders began to demand
attention of the country as a whole. While the Revolution had secured America as its own
entity, disputes among states threatened the security of the new nation. On September 14,
1865, Hon. Charles Sumner addressed the Republican State Convention in
Massachusetts, calling attention to the debate concerning civil liberties and security. He
stated, “Be just, and the republic will be strong.” Yet, as the revolution began, groups
within the young country expressed competing virtues. Groups within the country, often
elementarily depicted as southern states and northern states, disputed freedom as a human
and civil right. These disagreements came to a head during the American Civil War
(1861–1865).

17

Ibid., 29.
Milton Lipson, "Private Security: A Retrospective," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science (1988): 16.

18
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The need for private security expanded during the Industrial Revolution as the
birth of railroads and big business required protection for good transfers. Responding to
this need was the birth of private security firms, notably was Allan Pinkerton’s agency.19
In 1849, Pinkerton was named Chicago’s first detective, and, by 1850, he began a private
practice of investigation. Due to the need for private security at the time, Pinkerton’s
agency was a success, and by 1853, the agency housed a staff of five investigators
including one woman. On retainer with the agency were a number of railroad companies
including the Illinois Central Railroad and the Pennsylvania Railroad. During the Civil
War, Allen Pinkerton served the Union through President Abraham Lincoln.20
Following the Civil War, the need for private security in American industry
remained as expansion into the West continued and as questions concerning civil liberties
and economic/employee rights continued to foster public debate. The development of
private security organizations would come to shape the organization of security at a
national level. Questions concerning the founding values of American freedom—life,
liberty, and pursuit of happiness—created tensions among civilians. When the republic
unified at the conclusion of Civil War, a cohesive “capitalist political economy” resulted
in early 20th century prosperity.21 Within the country, opposition to social order continued
with the question of minority rights and the establishment of groups such as the Ku Klux
Klan. Externally, the U.S. worked to secure economic prosperity and security through
international efforts aimed at democratizing other nations.

19

Ibid. Pinkerton was a Scottish-born man who immigrated to a small town outside of Chicago at the age of
23. By happenchance, Pinkerton, while wondering a wooden area near his home, came across a plant
producing counterfeit currency. Upon alerting the local sheriff, Pinkerton was rewarded and named a
deputy sheriff of Kane County. This marked the beginning of Pinkerton’s career providing private security
20
Ibid., 18.
21
Walker, National Security and Core Values in American History, 46.
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Social issues throughout the U.S. resulted in a variety of local and national
concerns over crime. At the local level, violence increased due to famed gangsters such
as Al Capone and John Dillinger. Additionally, corruption in local politics and big
business continued (as was explored in the work of Upton Sinclair and his seminal text,
The Jungle). At the national level, arguments against capitalism came in the form of
anarchism. In 1901, U.S. President William McKinley was shot and killed by Leon
Czolgosz. Angry about capitalism and government policy following the loss of his
factory job, the FBI labeled Czolgosz as the first U.S. terrorist.22 In response to increasing
violence at the local, domestic, and national level, formal organizations charged with
preventing crime were established.
In 1896, the National Bureau of Criminal Identification was founded with the
purpose of gathering and releasing local crime information to police agencies across the
country. By 1912, local, federal, and national police forces existed in 48 states.23 In 1908,
Attorney General Charles J. Bonaparte, recruited 9 Secret Service investigators to join 25
of his own investigators. Bonaparte’s group was charged with conducting investigators
for the Department of Justice. In 1935, the group was formally named the Federal Bureau
of Investigations (FBI).
Beginning near the turn of the century, clandestine intelligence efforts increased.24
Efforts to protect the state from external threats were contained to the military at this
time. Apart from The Pinkerton Agency, the State Department’s Cipher Bureau (also
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known as the “American Black Chamber”) served as a national agency from 1917–1929,
and was charged with “collecting, deciphering, and analyzing signals intelligence.”25
Following WWI, Republican presidential candidate for the 1920 election, Warren G.
Harding, preached a return to prewar isolationism in regards to foreign affairs. Harding’s
commitment to isolationism gained him a significant advantage in the election, which he
won.26 However, as the country moved toward the Second World War, this sentiment of
isolationism was publicly challenged.
As foreshadowed in the above paragraphs, this project recognizes World War II
as a turning point in U.S. national security. As shown above, early U.S. national security
responded to the economic interests of the Colonies, and the need to be a unified country
among states following the Revolutionary War. During this time in American history, the
communicative goods protected and promoted by leaders of the country was access to a
free market without imperial taxes or limitations and commitments to the values
established by the founding documents of the country—the Bill of Rights and the
Constitution—which attempted to provide unity among states. Yet, as shown in the
following section, as past threats were resolved and new threats emerged, the
communicative goods that shaped national security in this early American period
transformed.
Security: World War II and the 1947 National Security Act
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National security prior to WWII was tied directly to the interests of given leaders
who interpreted security needs alongside a set pathway for the growth of a new country.
Until the attacks on Pearl Harbor, leaders maintained this sentiment of tying national
security directly to American interests. However, the communicative goods of security
connected to the interests of a young country would soon change with advances in
warfare introduced during World War II. As will be discussed in the following
subsection, while the system of national security in the U.S. formalized as a result of
WWII, many of the challenges facing the country during these early years continued into
the post-World War II era. Yet, the ways in which these challenges were addressed
changed significantly following the attacks on Pearl Harbor and the 1947 National
Security Act. Security scholars recognize the 1941 attacks on Pearl Harbor as a
significant turning point in American foreign policy and national security. While the
trend of economic security and isolation from threats abroad had carried the country into
the 1900s, the attacks on Pearl Harbor quickly altered the feelings of citizens and leaders
within the U.S., causing them to recognize the reality of external security threats.
Following World War II, trends in national security were tied to a modern system of
containment, which is a strategy of securing a nation’s interests and ideals by containing
the threat and expansion of competing governments.27 The work of Douglas T. Stuart,
chair of international studies at Dickinson University and director of civilian-military
education cooperation funded by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, guides this
subsection. Stuart’s work examines the move to modern national security.
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The concept of national security in the U.S. that we know today—one maintained
by multiple government organizations and driven by strategic intelligence with both
defensive and offensive aims—did not exist prior to U.S. involvement in WWII.
Following involvement in World War II, the ideal of isolationism with respect to securing
the country crumbled. The December 7, 1941 attacks on Pearl Harbor were a significant
turning point for leaders and citizens in the U.S., in terms of security. The attacks
uncovered the limits of isolationism and proved to Americans that they could not be
secure from technological advances leading to changes in perceived time and space.
Protection of the country had to extend beyond a sole focus on military capabilities and
had to last beyond wartime. National security transformed from a strategy implemented
at critical moments of fear, to one requiring maintenance during times of peace.
The current system of national security bureaucracy was foreshadowed in the
Roosevelt era following WWII and was formalized following the attacks on Pearl
Harbor.28 In his text, Creating the National Security State: A History of Law that
Transformed America, Douglas T. Stuart,29 chair of international studies as Dickinson
University, traces the roots of modern national security ideology among Americans to
WWII.30 Stuart recognizes the 1941 attacks on Pearl Harbor as a “turning point in
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American history,” at which point the concept of national security replaced the concept of
national interests as the guiding component of foreign policy. The effects of this change
were instrumental for the development and organization of national security efforts.31
In addition to the events leading to U.S. involvement in WWII, Stuart recognizes
the work of Edward Pendleton Herring (1903–2004), former Harvard University
professor of government, whose writings in the early 20th century introduced
policymakers to a concept of national security by challenging their current system of
defense.32 Herring served as president of the Social Science Research Council (1948–
1968),33 during which time he was influential in moving political science from a purely
theoretical study to a “behavioral science” drawing on many disciplines, including
sociology.34 Prior to the attacks at Pearl Harbor, Herring published The Impact of War in
which he worked to develop a systemic concept of national security.35 In his text, Herring
argued that technological developments in air warfare and the increase in totalitarian
regimes presented America with a unique and timely threat. While Herring recognized a
trend in the American public to be fearful of militarization, he argued that security
needed to be upheld by a powerful military who were integrated into and among society.

the success of Harding’s campaign, Stuart argues that 1932 presidential candidate, Franklin D. Roosevelt,
recognized the American public’s commitment to isolationism and expressed a commitment to this policy
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Even once current threats were dispersed, Herring argued that a system of national
security would need to be maintained continuously. Herring’s work fought against a stark
distinction between peace time and war time, arguing that the line between them was no
longer clear and that preparations for war needed to be made even during times of
peace.36 The attacks on Pearl Harbor confirmed Herring’s claims and stand as a turning
point in American public sentiment toward security. Specifically, the Pearl Harbor
attacks proved to leaders of America that (1) the lack of armed forces unification in
defense disallowed the army and navy to “prepare for, and respond to, a military attack;”
(2) that a central intelligence agency was needed; and (3) that a central system of
“civilian-military coordination” for national security was needed.37 These arguments
were “reinforced” during the rest of WWII.38
While WWII saw the creation of the first central intelligence organization, the
Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the organization was disbanded in October 1945 by
Harry Truman.39 Upon the death of President Roosevelt on April 12, 1945, Harry S.
Truman assumed the role of president. As a stark supporter of military unification,
Truman proposed unifications of the War Department (the Army) and the Navy
Department. A message to Congress on December 19, 1945, details his resistance.40
Speaking to military unification, Truman writes: “A grave responsibility will rest upon
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Congress if it continues to delay this most important and urgent measure.”41 Debate
ensued following the delivery of Truman’s letter to congress. While Army leaders
supported Truman’s plan for unification, James Forrestal, the then U.S. Secretary of
Navy, began searching for counter arguments. In his search for an alternative plan for
national security changes following WWII, Forrestal invited his friend, Ferdinand
Eberstadt, a U.S. lawyer and political advisor recognized for his contributions to the
creations of the National Security Council and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to
research the effects of unification on American national security.
Following the war, the questions and arguments concerning military unification,
the development of the CIA, and the coordination of military and civilian national
security came to the forefront of politics. These debates were addressed formally with the
1947 National Security Act. The National Security Act created the infrastructure of
American national security that stands today.
The outcomes of the National Security Act are as follows:


First, the act created the National Military Establishment (renamed the
Department of Defense in 1949) led by a Secretary of Defense. The Department
of Defense is a coordinated effort of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Chiefs of
Staffs (also established with the National Security Act), and the Office of the
Inspector General.

41
Harry S. Truman, “December 19, 1945 Special Message to the Congress Recommending the
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chapter, Truman also noted “the necessity of making timely preparations for the Nation’s long-range
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Second, the Act established the National Security Council. The Council was
created with the purpose of advising the President on domestic, foreign, and
military polices regarding national security.



Third, the Act established the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIA, under
the direction of the National Security Council, was established with the purpose
of “coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments
and agencies in the interest of national security,”42 to advise and make
recommendations to the NSC on such matters, and to obtain intelligence.



Fourth, the Act established the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
established under the provision for the National Military Establishments and
under the direction of the President and Secretary of Defense, was created with
the purpose of preparing plans for military direction and for unifying these
commands in the interests of the safety of the American public.

The National Security Act of 1947 set the precedent for the coordinated efforts of
national security in the U.S. for the years to come.
As witnessed through the previous paragraphs, the communicative goods of
national security in the U.S. dramatically shifted following World War II. After the
attacks on Pearl Harbor, American leaders and citizens recognized that the particular
interests of the country could no longer direct national security. Rather, national security
had to be proactive in an effort to secure the nation from external threats; gone were the
days where national security was simply response to emerging threats. Proactive security
required an ability to research, analyze, and forecast attacks. Following the 1947 National
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Security Act, the communicative goods of the U.S. transformed into strategic and counter
intelligence, domestic and international security agencies, and preventative practices of
security.
The 1947 Act introduced an understanding of national security that saw little
difference in peace times versus war times. National security in itself became a leading
interest of the nation. After the war, it was apparent that the “United States would have to
protect its national interests throughout the world without the support of a stronger
ally.”43 As the reach of communism at the hands of the Soviet Union stretched, new
security challenges emerged during the Cold War, to which this work now turns.
Security: The Cold War and Post-Cold War
Following the 1947 Security Act, America faced security challenges presented by
the rise of communism. The Cold War created a unique challenge to U.S. national
security. For arguably the first time in American history, threats to national security were
not simply driven by military forces; threats to national security at times were also formal
challenges of “ideological, social, and economic” stature.44 The following paragraphs tell
the story of U.S. national security responding to the Cold War using the work of Bruce D.
Berkowitz, Foreign Policy Research Institute fellow, former International Affairs fellow
at the Council on Foreign Relations, and lecturer at multiple foreign policy programs in
the United States, and Allan E. Goodman, president and chief executive officer of the
Institute of International Education and former dean of the School of Foreign Service at
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Georgetown University. This section textures the work of Berkowitz and Goodman with
the work of John Lewis Gaddis, professor of naval history at Yale University.
During the Cold War, a continuation of Roosevelt’s efforts of containing
international security threats through a policy of firm and patient displays of strength was
carried on by Truman.45 The Truman Doctrine, which went into effect in 1947, promised
economic and military supports to countries under threat by the Soviet Union.46 The Cold
War policy of containment highlighted the relationship between U.S. national security
and the environment of international relations as a whole. The policy recognized the
importance of spheres of influence and friendly relations with other political regimes. In
his seminal text on the policy of containment during WWII, Gaddis explains that
containment worked to defend national security with the following goals:
(1) restoration of the balance of power through the encouragement of selfconfidence in nations threatened by Soviet expansionism; (2) reduction, by
exploiting tension between Moscow and the international communist movements,
of the Soviet Union’s ability to project influence beyond its border; and (3)
modification, over time, of the Soviet concept of international relations, with a
view to bringing about a negotiated settlement of outstanding differences.47
During the Cold War, the notion of securing the nation through military force was
challenged as weapons of mass destruction and the sheer size of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR) and their forces made a successful vision of war appear as an
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unachievable goal.48 During the decades of Cold War, a move toward securing the nation
through policy and the support of democratic values superseded military efforts, as was
made apparent during the Cuban Missile Crisis (October 14–October 28, 1962) and
through the negative aftermaths of the Vietnam War (1955–1975). Criticism surrounding
American failures in the Vietnam War particularly urged leaders to think broadly about
the role of militarization and the role of natural security.
The Cuban Missile Crisis and Vietnam War showed that militarization alone was
insufficient for protecting the U.S. and its citizens. National security challenges were
complex matters involving communicative actors, events, and motives beyond the scope
of the current pressing issue. Thus, a military solution aimed toward securing the nation
with military capabilities required additional diplomatic support.
At the conclusion of the Cold War, marked in this project by the fall of the Berlin
Wall on November 9, 1989, and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the U.S. began
to face intricate and multifaceted challenges of national security. Stuart characterizes the
moment as a “cluster of complex and interacting threats including transnational terrorism,
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the spill-over effects of failed and
failing systems,”49 What the Cold War brought to light was the understanding of multiple
grounds upon which security threats stand. These grounds, including, and yet not limited
to, those of military, economic, and social challenges, since the Cold War, become areas
of importance in all efforts of securing the nation.
The unique challenges to national security that the Cold War presented also
determined the importance of ongoing strategic intelligence. During this time in
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American history, national security protected and promoted the influence of American
values in areas outside of its borders. The good of introducing and spreading democracy
as a strategic tool in the fight against communism directed the decisions of leaders.
During the Cold War, the focus of security practices was directed at the challenges
caused by the Soviet Union. At the conclusion of the War, and following the subsequent
dismantling of the Soviet Union, scholars began to question how the U.S. would adapt.50
The national system for security was broad and diverse and post-Cold War challenges
were not easy to identify.51
This section presented national security in this period as dynamic and everevolving. Specifically, national security, as the U.S. approaches it today, evolved from
multiple turning points in American history, including the attacks on Pearl Harbor and the
1947 National Security Act; these turning points called attention to gaps in security and
shifted the communicative goods of security. The following section introduces the 9/11
terrorist attacks as the most recent turning point in U.S. national security.
The Disruption of 9/11: Conclusions and Implications for this Project
The above historical account of U.S. national security provides a context for thinking
about the particular challenges to national security as they would emerge following the
attacks of 9/11. From the information provided above, we see a textured view of national
security policy in the U.S. as responding to the challenges of given times and places;
national security reflects and responds to a given communicative environment, and the
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organizations charged with defending national security adapt to these challenges as they
arise. This sentiment drives the remainder of this project.
The particular challenges of a post-Cold War world were exposed on September 11,
2001, when Islamic extremists strategically coordinated four terrorist attacks on the
United States. Since these attacks, there have been over 60,000 other terrorist attacks
worldwide (68,888 according to the University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database
(GTD) 2001-2014). Due to the severity of the attacks on 9/11 and the subsequent
increased visibility and vulnerability presented by terrorism, the catastrophe marks a
significant turning point in the history of U.S. national security. Yet, these attacks do not
stand apart from the broader historical, social, and political context presented above. As
this project argues, terrorism is grounded in and sustained by multiple background
sentiments. As such, terrorism present a dynamic challenge to security professionals
charged with counterterrorism.
In his seminal text on terrorism, Bruce Hoffman, director for the Center of Security
Studies at Georgetown University, writes, “The most feared terrorists are arguably those
who are the most successful in translating thought into action.”52 This work extends and
explores Hoffman’s sentiment with particular attention paid to the importance of
communication ethics. Attentiveness to communication ethics frames communicative
action as situated within a historical context, amongst a diversity of communicative
goods, and in response to the demands of a given communicative event. Terrorists do not
think and act apart from the moment in which they stand. This work adds that terrorism
and counterterrorism are not only driven by a motive of translating thought into action,
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but rather, risking one’s life to defend particular communicative goods. This chapter,
therefore, serves as the hermeneutic entry into the remainder of this project.
This chapter provided insights on the history of U.S. national security, which allows
us to shift our focus of attention away from national security as an end goal to national
security as an on-going concern involving ever-evolving challenges and demands that
shape our time. Of primary concern for this project is how national security responds to
the demands of a given moment. As leaders interpret emerging threats, the narrative,
goods, and practices that define national security shift. Understanding the stories that
shape national security provides greater clarity into the practices used to defend a nation.
When we shift our definition of national security from an objective goal to an
overarching metaphor that shapes a given moment’s security practices, we open the term
for broader intel and application. Understanding national security as embedded in a given
moment and responsive to the stories that shape our time affords us a more solid ground
to begin this project’s investigation.
The next chapter begins where this introductory chapter leaves us—the story of
September 11, 2001. This project recognizes 9/11 as a significant turning point in
American national security. The attacks presented an existential crisis to national security
professionals by displaying the reality that current security practices were inept to meet
the demands of a world riddled with terrorism.
The attacks on 9/11 demanded of security professionals new means for responding to
the emerging challenges of our time with advanced practices and insight. The following
chapter frames post 9/11 terrorism and counterterrorism practices as communicative
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gestalts driven by grounded background commitments. Communication ethics yields
insight and new directions for exploring these current challenges.
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Chapter 2: Communication and Competing Backgrounds: The Interruption of 9/11
In this project, communication ethics attends to the emerging questions that shape
a given historical moment. Stories guide one’s engagement with the historical moment
and offer appropriate grounds for responding to current existential demands. Engagement
with the stories that shape our moment allots the communicator with what Aristotle
termed phrônesis, or the practical wisdom for meeting the demands of a particular
moment.53 This chapter engages the events of September 11, 2001 as story for guiding
our engagement with counterterrorism in this particular moment. September 11, 2001
marks the most recent turning point in U.S. national security. 9/11 exposed the power and
reach of Islamic terror groups, most notably, al-Qaeda, and made visible the security
limitations of the U.S. intelligence community. In response to the attacks, U.S. leaders
called for a reevaluation of national security practices, arguing that Cold War security
practices were no longer sufficient to meet the demands of terrorism in the 21st century.
Within the FBI, organizational change was vast. Over a decade after the 9/11 attacks,
security experts reflected upon the success and failures of new security practices. This
contemporary reflection showed that gaps exist in the effort to fight and prevent
terrorism. While reports recognize notable successes of the FBI, there remain areas for
improvement. These areas continue to frame the context of counterterrorism.
For the purposes of this project as a whole, this chapter achieves two primary
goals. First, by articulating the story of 9/11, this chapter showcases the FBI as a primary
counterterrorism resource. Second, this chapter frames responses to 9/11 to identify gaps
in counterterrorism prior to 9/11.
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Introduction
Over 15 years after the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, these events continue
to shape our nation’s security practices and response to threats. 9/11 proved that Cold
War methods were inadequate against terrorism and that a major restructuring of the
security apparatus of the U.S. was necessary. In response to the attacks, security leaders
urged the intelligence community to work together in making counterterrorism a national
security priority, resulting in structural changes within security organizations. This
chapter tells the story of 9/11 beginning with a selective history and sequence of the
day’s events. This chapter continues by overviewing the recommended changes for the
intelligence community and concludes by discussing the success of the current state of
the FBI. The 9/11 terror attacks continue to shape our engagement with counterterrorism
and offer a ground for responding to current and future threats. The attacks are also a
significant influence on the FBI counterterrorism narrative. Exploring this story provides
us with a practical entryway for thinking about communication ethics applications.
Through three sections, the following pages engage two major official reflections
on 9/11. Section one, “September 11, 2001: The 9/11 Commissioner Report,” tells the
story of 9/11 using The 9/11 Commissioner’s Report. The U.S. government recognizes
this report as an official “full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.”54 The purpose of this section is twofold. First, this
section presents an account of the day’s events as told by official representatives of the
U.S. government. Second, this selective history textures the story of 9/11 to show the
diverse backgrounds and competing communicative goods made visible on September
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11, 2001. While it is important to note that there exists multiple versions and
interpretations of 9/11 as story, this project, in focusing on FBI counterterrorism, limits
exploration of this story to the U.S. government’s official account of the event. Section
two, “September 11, 2001: National Security Report,” overviews the immediate response
to the attacks by the U.S. government, and outlines the recommendations for improving
security practices to effectively respond to terrorism made by the 9/11 Commission. The
purpose of this section is to outline the security gaps identified by U.S. leaders in
response to 9/11. These gaps shape over a decade of counterterrorism practices in the
U.S. and remain a valid source of referral for implementing changes to security processes
and procedures. Section three, “FBI and Counter-Terrorism: Adapting to New Threats,”
turns to the Congressionally mandated response to the Commission Report entitled “The
FBI: Protecting the Homeland in the 21st Century.” This recently released report responds
to the recommendations for terrorism prevention presented by the 9/11 Commission. The
report outlines the FBI’s successes and opportunities for growth with respect to
counterterrorism. This chapter ends by identifying places of value where communication
ethics research and practice can make a contribution to further understanding the needs of
security professionals and vetting the practices of these professionals.
The story recounted below presents a backdrop to the attacks that forever changed
the way in which the U.S. thinks about and coordinates counterterrorism. The attacks on
September 11, 2001 exposed the reality of Islamic terror and displayed the limitations of
the U.S. defense community. Following the attacks, two significant and demanding
questions arose: Why must we change our security practices? And, how can we adapt our
intelligence community to better address the threat of terrorism? Nearly two decades
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following the 9/11 attacks, these questions continue to demand research as security gaps
still exist in U.S. efforts to fight terrorism. The story of 9/11, as a significant turning point
in U.S. national security, continues to shape the narrative of national security writ large.
Communication ethics in this project takes seriously the stories that shape one’s
communicative practices. For current and ongoing security demands, 9/11 acts as a
pivotal story that guides communicative response. The richness of 9/11 shows us that
counterterrorism practices must attend to the complex and dynamic background
influences that fuel foreground violence when there is any attempt to make sense of
future directions.
September 11, 2001: A Selective History
Immediately following 9/11, families of 9/11 victims, the American public, and
leaders in the U.S. and abroad called for an official inquiry into the attacks and a
recounting of the event. In November 2002, the U.S. Congress and President at the time,
George W. Bush, responded to the call for this official response and announced the
establishment of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, a
bipartisan and independent group of ten commissioners charged with preparing a
complete account of the 9/11 terror attacks. This Commission worked with two
objectives: First, the Commission provided clarity to the story of al-Qaeda and the
background of the 9/11 attacks. Second, the Commission provided direction for counterterrorism by articulating security practices to prevent future attacks.55
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On July 22, 2004, the Commission released “The 9/11 Commission Report.” The
Commission closed on August 21, 2004.56 The purpose of the Report was to provide a
full account of the terror attacks to best of the committee’s ability and to acknowledge
valuable lessons regarding preparation for and prevention against future attacks. The
authorized edition of the report includes thirteen chapters.57 These chapters fit within
three theme areas:


Chapters one through eight discuss the background of the events including a
history of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda and an overview of the 9/11 hijackers.



Chapters nine and ten tell the story of the day’s event and immediate aftermath.



Chapters eleven through thirteen present recommendations for advancements in
U.S. national security.

This section is divided into two main subsections, which, taken together, summarizes
chapter one through chapter ten. Subsection one, The Story of 9/11: The Emergence of a
New Terrorism, overviews the history of bin Laden and al-Qaeda. It also provides an
overview of U.S. security responses to bin Laden. Subsection two, September 11, 2001:
Overview of Events, recounts the events of 9/11 beginning with the strategic planning of
the attacks and ending with event of the day. As a whole, this section contextualizes the
story of 9/11 in an effort to show the complexity, depth, and richness of this story.
The Story of 9/11: The Emergence of a New Terrorism
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The story of 9/11 begins with the conclusion of the Cold War and the birth of the
modern Middle East. The modern Middle East resulted from the fall of the Ottoman
Empire at the conclusion of World War I and independence from Western powers
following World War II. During the 1960s and 1970s, Middle East states experienced a
period of vast social and economic prosperity.58 This growth resulted in “unmodernized
oil states attempt[ing] to shortcut decades of development.”59 Quickly, education reforms
and vast infrastructure projects began. Yet, by the late 1980s, decreasing oil revenues
negatively impacted the economy as corruption and the downfall of public programs
increased. By the 1990s, high birthrates and a declining economy resulted in an increased
population of young, unemployed men among Middle Eastern states.
Authors of The 9/11 Commission Report attribute these social ills to the
development of what they call new terrorism in the Middle East. Distrust in the
government and anger at corrupt leaders resulted in violence planned and executed by
non-state actors typically associated with extremist organizations. Unlike traditional
terrorism led by small groups with clear political goals, this new wave of terrorists
organized widespread violence based on religious grounds. Authors of the Commission
Report write that the significance of new terrorism for national security was seen in 1998
when Osama bin Laden, publicly recognized leader of al-Qaeda during the September 11,
2001 attacks, issued a public fatwa (religious order) in an Afghan newspaper. While the
roots of this extremist terror began in the 1980s and 1990s, This fatwa, given by bin
Laden was one of the first significant public statements of terror released from Islamic
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terror leaders. To place this fatwa into context, the Commission provides a brief history
of bin Laden and the birth and development of al-Qaeda. The following paragraphs
summarize this selective history.
The story of al-Qaeda begins in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, conflict with the
Soviet Union between 1979 and 1989 provided Islamic extremists with a common goal
and meeting place. This common center—a shared enemy—under the leadership of bin
Laden would eventually birth al-Qaeda. During this decade of conflict in the late 1970s
through the late 1980s, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in an effort to maintain
Communist control of the country. Afghan nationals resisted the intervention and young
Muslims from around the world came to Afghanistan to aid their companions in the fight
against Soviet Russia. bin Laden stood out among volunteers; his family’s fortune
allowed him to be a major financer of the anti-Soviet fight. For bin Laden, the success of
Afghanistan depended upon a larger, worldwide organization. In April 1988, the Afghan
jihad was successfully expelling Soviet forces. Leaders of the jihad including bin Laden
debated what to do next. bin Laden and others agreed that the organization should not
break up and established a foundation, al-Qaeda, as a headquarters for a global jihad.60
By August 1988, al-Qaeda followers recognized bin Laden as their leader.
In 1991, bin Laden, at the request of Hassan al Turabi, a Sudanese political leader,
moved al-Qaeda headquarters to Sudan. Over the course seven years, bin Laden laid the
groundwork for a global extremist organization. By August 1998, al-Qaeda included a
military, financial component, political committee, media affairs and propaganda group,
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intelligence group, and an Advisory Council made up of bin Laden’s closest confidants.61
Mosques and schools around the world served as recruitment centers for al-Qaeda. In
Egypt, Ayman al Zawahiri led a group of Egyptian jihads. Shortly after the victory in
Afghanistan, Zawahiri’s group joined forces with al-Qaeda. The relationship between bin
Laden and al Zawahiri would last many years with Zawahiri replacing bin Laden as
leader of al-Qaeda following bin Laden’s capture by U.S. forces.62 By the early to mid1990’s, bin Laden had established himself as a well-known leader among Islamic
extremists. As leader, he focused his attention on attacking the United States. The
Commission notes that with the support of al-Qaeda members and extremist leaders
around the world, bin Laden began approving attacks on the U.S.
Throughout the 1990s, Islamic extremists planned and executed a number of
small terror attacks against the U.S. and its supporters.63 In 1996, bin Laden returned to
Afghanistan where the Taliban had exerted control over much of the country excluding
some key centers such as Kabul.64 The Taliban offered a safe haven to all persons who
wanted to travel to Afghanistan and train in their camps. Thus, the alliance between the
Taliban and bin Laden gave al-Qaeda a home plate to train fighters and connect with
other extremist groups. In 1998, bin Laden issued the public fatwa discussed in previous
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paragraphs. This fatwa was a “public launch of a renewed and stronger al-Qaeda.”65 By
the summer of 1998, the strength of al-Qaeda was displayed on an international scale.
The Commission writes that al-Qaeda’s first organized strategic attack occurred in
August 1998 when trucks carrying bombs drove into the U.S. Embassies in East Africa
(the Nairobi Embassy, Kenya and Dar es Salaam Embassy, Tanzania). The attack in
Nairobi killed 12 Americans and 201 other persons of varying nationalities. The attack in
Dar es Salaam killed 11 additional people. Following the African embassy attacks, U.S.
president at the time, Bill Clinton, organized a response to al-Qaeda. As noted in the
Commission Report, the 1998 embassy bombing shaped U.S. policy toward al-Qaeda
until the 9/11 attacks. Experts expressed a need to “reevaluate the threat posed by bin
Laden,”66 and even though intelligence linked bin Laden to the attacks, a divide amongst
U.S. leadership existed. This divide separated those who recognized bin Laden as a
“novel threat” and recommended action, and those who believed bin Laden not to be
dangerous enough for a U.S. response. This divide is witnessed within security agencies
leading up to the 9/11 attacks.
Authors of the Commission Report note that “although the 1995 National
Intelligence Estimate had warned on a new type of terrorism, many officials continued to
think of terrorists as agents of states . . .. Hence, government efforts to cope with
terrorism were essentially the work of individual agencies.”67 At the federal level, the
Justice Department was responsible for counterterrorism, with the FBI being the
dominant agency. Abroad, the CIA and State Department were responsible for
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counterterrorism intelligence. While these agencies were leaders in U.S.
counterterrorism, the White House did make efforts to combat new terrorism, and often,
resources were not allocated or viable for these agencies to successfully grasp the scope
and range of terrorists’ capabilities. For instance, in 1995, Clinton issued the Presidential
Decision Directive 39 stating that the “United States should ‘deter, defeat, and respond
vigorously to all terrorist attacks.’”68 Clinton also allotted increased funds to the FBI
designated for counterterrorism, and supported budget requests within the CIA for
counterterrorism objectives. Abroad, Clinton encouraged cooperation among nations in
support of counterterrorism and denying homes to terrorist organizations.69 These
directives, however, resulted only in small counterterrorism policy changes within the
FBI and CIA.
In 1996, the CIA, then interested in terrorism finance, developed the bin Laden
Unit, a headquartered based unit focused solely on research aimed at bin Laden. In May
1996, the unit received an intelligence “breakthrough” when Jamal Ahmed al Fadl, a
former senior employee of bin Laden, went to a U.S. embassy in Africa and provided the
CIA with information on al-Qaeda directives and objectives.70 With the assistance of
Fadl, by 1997, the bin Laden unit recognized al-Qaeda as a leading terrorist organization
and bin Laden as the leader. By 1998, the CIA and agencies within the Justice
Department were developing plans to capture and trial bin Laden for attacks in the
1990s.71 Yet, only one plan for capture was fully prepared. In 1998, the CIA
Counterterrorist Center sought approval for a bin Laden capture plan—a plan well
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detailed and rehearsed. However, senior management within the CIA worried about the
risk of the plan and decided that these risks outweighed the benefits. No other plan to
capture bin Laden was successfully or fully developed before 9/11.72
For the FBI, Clinton appointed Louis Freech as Director; Freech recognized
terrorism as a significant threat to homeland security.73 In 1999, the agency underwent a
large reorganization process, which included the development of the Counterterrorism
Division.74 This development marked the first time that counterterrorism activities were
handled within a stand-alone division. In 2000, the Chief of the Counterterrorism
Division, Dale Watson, launched MAXCAP 05, a program to “enhance the FBI’s
counterterrorism capacity” across all FBI offices.75 In theory, the FBI established plans to
make counter-terrorism a significant priority. In reality, field offices did not dedicate
significant resources to counterterrorism. These offices, instead, maintained focus on
local priorities and criminal justice, both apart from intelligence and terrorism research.
As a result, the FBI did not complete any assessments regarding the “overall threat” of
terrorism to the U.S. prior to 9/11.76 At the time of the September 11, 2001 attacks, upto-date intelligence regarding the capabilities of al-Qaeda was not available.
As the U.S. was determining an appropriate response to bin Laden and al-Qaeda,
terrorists were strategically developing plans for the 9/11 attacks. As shown in the above
paragraphs, significant gaps in counterterrorism knowledge and practice were present
leading up to the attacks. First, security professionals in the U.S. developed no successful
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plans to address the threat of bin Laden before 9/11. Second, the FBI completed no
formal assessments regarding the capabilities, plans, and reach of terror groups prior to
9/11. As discussed, by the late 1990s, al-Qaeda was a worldwide organization
spearheaded by bin Laden. The organization “relied heavily on the ideas and work of
enterprising and strong-willed field commanders who enjoyed considerable autonomy.”77
Field officers strategically planned and executed the 9/11 terror attacks. Authors of the
Commission Report discuss Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as the “mastermind” of the
attacks.78 The following section discusses the planning and execution of the 9/11 attacks.
The Story of 9/11: Planning 9/11
The 9/11 terror attacks began with a proposal by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to
bin Laden in the mid 1990s. As a major player in the story of 9/11, the authors of the
Commission Report spent time presenting the story of Mohammed’s life and plans for
attacks against the U.S. Mohammed serves as the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks and his
life story is one of diversity. Below is an overview of this story.
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (b. 1964) joined the Muslim Brotherhood79 at the age
of sixteen. Upon graduating from secondary school in 1983, Mohammed left his
hometown of Kuwait and enrolled in Chowan College in North Carolina. Soon after,
Mohammed transferred to North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University
where he graduated with a Mechanical Engineering degree in December 1986. After
graduation, Mohammed returned to the Middle East to join anti-Soviet fighters in
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Afghanistan. In 1987, Mohammed visited Pakistan. While in Pakistan, Mohammed’s
brother introduced him to Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, Head of the Afghanistan Islamic Union
Party (also referred to as the Islamic Dawah Organization of Afghanistan).80 Sayyah
became Mohammed’s mentor, and between 1988 and 1992, Mohammed ran a
nongovernmental organization under Sayyah’s sponsorship. Around this time,
Mohammed learned of Ramzi Yousef, the organizer of the 1993 World Trade Center
bombings. Mohammed came to the attention of U.S. intelligence agencies after wiring
$660.00 to supporters of Yousef. Yousef’s 1993 attack inspired Mohammed to plan his
own attack against the U.S.81 Authors of the Commission Report write that Mohammed’s
disdain of the U.S. stemmed from his disagreement with U.S. policy favoring Israel over
the Palestinian Liberation Organization. By 1994, Mohammed and Yousef accompanied
one another to the Philippines and began planning the “Manila air plot.”82 The Manila air
plot was a terror plan intended to bomb a dozen U.S. airplanes in flight at the same time.
The plan was stopped by U.S. intelligence and Philippine authorizes, but Yousef was not
captured until years later.
In 1996, Mohammed travelled to Afghanistan to meet bin Laden. During this
meeting, Mohammed proposed his plan for the 9/11 attacks. His original proposal
included an airplane attack on key cities in the United States and a simultaneous airplane
attack in East Asia. By 1999, bin Laden gave Mohammed the “green light” for his World
Trade Center plot and selected four individuals to serve as the suicide pilots— Khalid al
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Mihdhar, Nawaf al Hazmi, Khallad and Abu Bara al Yemeni. In the fall of 1999, the four
chosen pilots attended a training course with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. The training
session focused on physical fitness, English language skills, firearms and target practice
among other skills. In the spring of 2000, bin Laden ordered the cancelling of the East
Asia portion of the 9/11 attacks. Thus, the attention of Mohammed and the chosen pilots
lay solely on the U.S.83
In the beginning months of 2000, bin Laden added the so called “Hamburg
group” to the list of persons responsible for carrying out the 9/11 attacks. The Hamburg
group84 included four aspiring Islamic extremists from Germany who were fluent in
English and familiar with the West. Each of the Hamburg group members—Mohamed
Atta, Ramzi Binalshibh, Marwan al Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah—served as key plays in the
attacks. Upon formal inclusion in the attacks, the four men returned to Germany to begin
training. As noted in the Commission Report, the 9/11 terrorists spent between $400,000
and $500,000 on planning, training, and conducting the attacks.85 By May 2000, the 9/11
jihadists were arriving in the United States.
Within the U.S., major political changes took attention away from
counterterrorism preparations. Authors of the Commission Report note that the
“millennium scare” of 2000 consumed much of the FBIs attention, and that the
presidential election of 2000 played a significant role in the preparedness of the
intelligence community. These events, coupled with disagreements within the FBI
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concerning the capabilities of bin Laden and Islamic terrorism, kept the attention of
security professionals away from terrorism.
In November 2000, the U.S. presidential election resulted in a race so close that
the Supreme Court was charged with deciding the outcome. Due to the circumstances of
the vote, the transition period between Bill Clinton and George W. Bush was shortened
by nearly half. The quick transition in personnel and the cut in time for training resulted
in a steep learning curve regarding security threats, bin Laden, and al-Qaeda. During the
36-day transition, the newly named security advisor, Condoleezza Rice, and her deputy,
Stephen Hadley, focused attention on the disputes with “China, missile defense, and the
collapse of the Middle East peace process.”86 While attention amongst some security
leaders was directed at al-Qaeda, the debate regarding the actual threat that al-Qaeda and
bin Laden posed to the U.S. was ongoing.
At the FBI, Watson and Director Freeh continued to argue for additional funding
and attention for counterterrorism. In the spring of 2001, Freeh announced his retirement.
Just prior to 9/11, Freeh’s successor, Robert Mueller took office.87 Additionally, after
winning the Presidential election, Bush named John Ashcroft as U.S. Attorney General.
Upon his entrance to this new role, Ashcroft expressed the need for reform within the
FBI. These transfers of power between key security personnel created gaps in knowledge
and policy as funding and direction of counterterrorism was revised.
In the days and hours leading up to the attacks on the morning of September 11,
2001, all signals regarding a terror attack on U.S. soil were “blinking red.”88 Yet,
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significant transitions of power and leadership within the U.S. drew attention away from
the terrorist threat thus creating gaps in security knowledge. As the attacks began and
continued throughout the morning hours of 9/11, the vulnerability of U.S. intelligence
and preparation was exposed. The following section overviews the day’s events on
September 11, 2001.
September 11, 2001: Overview of Events
This section describes the events on September 11, 2001, overviewing the story of
the attack and initial response to the attack as listed in The 9/11 Commission Report. It
also summarizes the story reported by the Commission. On September 11, 2001, 19
terrorists from a variety of social backgrounds and countries of origins hijacked four
planes with the purpose of carrying out well-planned suicide attacks at four strategically
selected sites across the U.S. Two of the planes hit the Twin Towers in Lower Manhattan,
one crashed into the Pentagon, and one crashed in a field in Pennsylvania. Close to 3000
persons perished due to the attacks. These attacks serve as a significant turning point in
U.S. national security that continue to shape U.S. counterterrorism policy nearly two
decades later.
The hijackings took place on the morning of September 11, 2001. The first of four
planes, American Flight 11, was scheduled to fly from Logan Airport in Boston,
Massachusetts to Los Angeles, California on the morning of September 11. The aircraft
was boarded by five hijackers, Mohamed Atta, Abdulaziz al-Omari, Wail al-Shehri,
Waleed al-Shehri, and Satam al-Suqami. Both Atta and Omari had arrived at Logan
International around 6:00am by a flight travelling from Portland, Oregon to Boston.
American 11 took off from Logan International at 7:59 a.m.
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At a second terminal in Logan International, Marwan al-Shehhi, Fayez
Banihammad, Mohand al-Shehri, Hamza al-Ghamdi, and Ahmen al-Ghamdi boarded
United Airlines Flight 175 to Los Angeles International Airport. United Flight 175 took
off from Logan International shortly before 8:00 a.m. Concurrently, Hani Janjour, Khalid
al-Mihdhar, Majed Moqed, Nawaf al-Hazmi, and Salem al-Hazmi boarded American
Airlines Flight 77 at Dulles International Airport in Washington, D.C. The flight, headed
for Los Angeles International airport departed D.C. at 8:20 a.m. Finally, in Newark, NJ,
Ziad Jarrah, Ahmedal-Haznawi, Ahmen al-Nami, and Saeed al-Ghamdi, boarded United
Airlines Flight 93 to San Francisco International Airport. The plane departed Newark at
8:42 a.m.
Of the 19 hijackers, 10 were selected for extra screening during the pre-flight
security checkpoints. Each of the 10 received extra baggage screening before being
allowed entrance to the flight terminals. American Flight 11 from Logan International
Airport in Boston to Los Angeles International Airport was hijacked approximately at
8:14 a.m. Communication between flight attendants Betty Ong and Madeline “Amy”
Sweeny and the American Airlines Southeastern Reservations Office in Cary, North
Carolina allowed Boston’s Air Traffic Control Center to be alerted of the hijacking.89 At
8:46 a.m., the flight crashed into the North Tower of World Trade Center in New York
City killing all persons on board and an unknown number of persons working in the
tower.
United Flight 175 was hijacked sometime between 8:42 a.m. and 8:46 a.m.
Communication between passengers onboard the flight and their family members alerted
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authorities to the hijacking. Additionally, the rerouting of the plane away from Los
Angeles and toward New York City cautioned New York Air Traffic Controllers of a
possible problem aboard the plane. At 9:03 a.m., United Flight 175 struck the South
Tower of the World Trade Center killing all on board and an unknown number of persons
working in the Tower.90
American Flight 77 was hijacked sometime between 8:51 a.m. and 8:54 a.m. At
8:56 a.m., the plane’s transponder was turned off thus alerting Indianapolis Air Traffic
Control of an issue. At 9:00 a.m., American Airlines Executive Vice President, Gerard
Arpey, ordered all American Airline Flights in the Northeast to be grounded until further
notice. Upon learning of the hijacking of United Flight 175, Arpey grounded all
American Airlines flights nationwide. At 9:37 a.m., American Flight 77 crashed into the
Pentagon in Washington, D.C. killing all on board and an unknown number of personnel
in the building.91
The pilots of United Flight 93 were alerted to the previous hijacking at 9:24 a.m.
At approximately 9:28 a.m., the flight was hijacked. Communication between passengers
and their family members alerted passengers to the previous three hijackings. Aware that
they were in a hijacking, the passengers attempted to fight the terrorists. The passengers
succeeded in preventing the terrorists from reaching their destination of Washington,
D.C. The plane crashed into a field in Somerset County, Pennsylvania, killing all
passengers on board.
Upon knowledge of the hijackings and the subsequent crashing of aircrafts into
the North and South Towers of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, U.S. leadership
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began implementing crisis management practices. The 9/11 Commission noted that the
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) were “unprepared” to manage the circumstances of the 9/11
hijackings.92 Therefore, the President, Vice-President, and Secret Service of the United
States worked without clear Intel on the situation.
At 8:30 p.m. on the evening of 9/11, President Bush addressed the nation from the
White House declaring, “We will make no distinction between the terrorists who
committed these acts and those who harbor them.”93 Within the White House, leaders
worked to coordinate immediate and long-term emergency response efforts. By the
following day, September 12, 2001, Bush led meetings regarding the declaration of war
against terrorists. As noted in the Commission Report, while intelligence sharing between
security organizations was not a priority, as soon as a week following the attacks, what
would become the U.S. Patriot Act began to take shape.94
Over the weekend of September 15 and 16, 2001, President Bush coordinated
meetings amongst his war council at Camp David with the purpose of “assign[ing] tasks
for the first wave of war against terrorism.”95 These tasks evolved into the National
Security Presidential Directive 9 (or, “Defeating the Terrorist Threat to the United
States”). The directive expanded war against Al-Qaeda to war against all terrorists and
restated the president’s remarks not to distinguish between terrorist and those who harbor
them.96 In a set of meetings on September 21 and October 2, Bush approved military
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action against Afghanistan. This plan, “Enduring Freedom,” included four phases of
military action:
1. In the days and weeks following 9/11, the U.S. and its allies moved forces into the
countries surrounding Afghanistan.
2. Beginning on October 7, air strikes and special operation attacks hit for key alQaeda and Taliban locations.
3. By December, all key Afghan cities fell to the coalition.
4. After liberation, armed forces focused on security and stabilization of the
country.97
In addition to the action taken against Afghanistan, military plans for actions against Iraq
began to take shape.
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States ends their
story of the 9/11 attacks with the overview of plans for Afghanistan. At the time of the
reports completion, this publicly accepted text offers as full and complete recounting of
the events leading to 9/11, the terror attacks, and the immediate aftermath.
This selective history of 9/11 textures the story of the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks showing the multiple persons, voices, and actions taken to develop,
execute and respond to this communicative event. Of particular importance, the history
reveals the driving forces of the 9/11 jihadists, including their commitments and beliefs.
On September 11, 2001, nineteen men from nineteen different backgrounds, funded by
multiple sources, carried out the most deadly terror attacks ever witnessed on American
soil. These men died for their cause, and their motives, commitments, and actions
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continue to persuade persons toward violence today. Understanding the varying and
multiple background, influences, and identifies of these men shapes the context of the
9/11 attacks as expending far beyond the day of the event. This event, and the
communicative events leading up to it, exposed U.S. national security as incapable of
meeting the demands of emerging threats.
The 9/11 Commission Report ends with a discussion of the security failures
identified before and during 9/11. Responding to these failures, the Commission provided
recommendations for counterterrorism practices in hindsight of 9/11. The following
section outlines the recommendations for improving security practices as a contributing
portion of the story of 9/11.
September 11, 2001: National Security Report
Distance and time provide greater clarity to the security practices in place prior to
9/11. At the conclusion of the Cold War, America “stood out as an object for admiration,
envy, and blame.”98 As shown in the selective history discussed above, intelligence
leaders found it difficult to secure funds or approval for counterterrorism practices as the
threat of al-Qaeda often seemed distant and minor compared to local challenges including
drug and mafia related crimes, amongst other domestic criminal activities. As the
Commission notes, while Afghanistan seemed very far away to the U.S., the U.S. seemed
within reach for members of al-Qaeda.99 If the American public and American leaders
recognized al-Qaeda as an approaching threat, the outcome of 9/11 may have been
different. However, as noted within the 9/11 report, hindsight is often 20/20. The focus of
attention now, proclaimed the Commission, must remain on the valuable security lessons
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9/11 taught us. With distance, time, and clarity, the Commission identified the following
four failures regarding pre-9/11 national security and terrorism: imagination, policy,
capabilities, and management.100 The following paragraphs will introduce these four
failures—imagination, policy, capabilities, and management. These failures will continue
to serve as a significant source of reflection throughout the remainder of this project. As
this work continues to discuss the relationship between communication ethics and
counterterrorism practices, it will periodically refer to these failures in greater detail as a
cornerstone of security opportunities and limitations.
Imagination—The Commission notes that leaders and the public alike did not
understand the threat of al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden prior to the 9/11 attacks. Despite
intelligence reports noting bin Laden’s desire to attack the U.S., “there were no complete
portraits of [bin Laden’s] strategy or of the extent of his organization’s involvement in
the past terrorist attacks.”101 While both former U.S. president Clinton and former
president Bush were briefed on bin Laden, the Commission argues that the threat was not
“compelling.”102 Yet, the Commission also argues that suicide attacks and the hijackings
of planes were both terrorism realities prior to 9/11. Since the attacks at Pearl Harbor, the
intelligence community has raised awareness regarding security preparations for surprise
attacks. While efforts to thwart surprise attacks have been discussed by multiple leading
researchers, each of these methods include practices to “institutionalize imagination”; or,
to see the capabilities of terror organizations as unlimited.103 The Commission
recommended that the following practices could institutionalize imagination in a way that
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could prevent future surprise attacks. These practices include (1) brainstorming about
how attacks may be carried out; (2) identifying telltale indications that a surprise attack is
being planned; (3) collect intelligence on the indicators when possible; and (4) integrate
defense mechanisms to stop or alert to the most deadly attacks.104 These practices, the
Commission argues, were never developed or implemented into security practices prior to
9/11.105
Policy—The Commission argues that the 1998 Embassy bombings offered an
opportunity for the entire intelligence community to exam the threat of bin Laden and alQaeda. This examination could have made visible the reach and power of al-Qaeda.
However, security organizations “did not meet this the threat.”106 Policymakers placed
responsibility with the CIA, who, the Commissioner argues, worked hard to prevent an
attack. However, the CIA alone was limited in their efforts. Before 9/11, the president
took no action against al-Qaeda. Therefore, no formal policy for addressing Islamic
terrorism existed. As a result, transfers between leadership created gaps concerning the
policies and procedures for terrorism research and counterterrorism practiced.
Capabilities—Prior to 9/11, leaders attempted to combat al-Qaeda with the same
capabilities used during the Cold War. “These capabilities were insufficient, but little was
done to expand or reform them.”107 In addition, the Commission writes that at no point
prior to 9/11 was the entire Defense Department entirely engaged on the terrorism threat.
In the domestic arena, the FBI failed to link intelligence and agent knowledge to national
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threats.108 Finally, the lack of communication and sharing of intelligence between
agencies resulted in security gaps and intelligence overlaps. There was no developed
procedure for sharing intelligence across organizational lines. Thus, resources were
limited by an inability to foster strong intelligence relationships between security
organizations.
Management—As discussed above, communication between agencies was nearly
limited. Thus, the intelligence community failed to work as a team. Clarity of objectives
and roles was not managed between and among intelligence offices effectively. In effect,
there were missed opportunities concerning the communication and management of
terrorism research. 109 What was missing prior to 9/11, the Commission argued, was an
overarching manager who communicated the roles and security needs to various
organizations. Without a developed plan for communicating roles, policies, and
procedures, each agency, office, and personnel worked independently toward a variety of
different objectives and goals. When personnel attempted to alert others of terrorism
threats, they were met with resistance; this resistance prevented the allocation of
resources necessary to develop formal plans capable of addressing the threat of al-Qaeda.
Reflecting on the failures outlined above, the Commission developed a list of
security practices for the U.S. intelligence community to implement. Specifically, the
Commission outlined considerable security changes for the FBI, which included a
detailed plan for implementing budget increases put into effect following 9/11. The
enemy, Commissioners argued, was twofold: First, there is al-Qaeda, the network of
terrorists; Second, is Islamic extremism, a “radical ideological movement” inspiring

108
109

Ibid., 352.
Ibid., 357—358.

54

terrorists around the globe.110 A successful counterterrorism strategy will be broad,
including policy and military objectives that address each of the aforementioned enemies
alongside future terror networks that could possibly stem from a variety of ideologies and
places.
Broadly, the requested changes reflect the following all-encompassing
recommendations: (1) The intelligence community must be unified under a director and
share information between and among agencies; (2) The community must balance its
commitment to criminal justice and national security, (3) The U.S. should commit itself
long-term to the stabilization of Afghanistan and the rooting out of terror cells; (4) The
U.S. should work with other nations to support youth in Muslim states and combatting
Islamic terrorism; and (5) The U.S. should be vigilant in tracking terror funding. These
broad recommendations were successfully implemented by changing the practices within
the various agencies of the U.S.
Due to the focus of this particular project resting with the FBI as an entrance into
the intelligence community at large, the following paragraphs outline the FBI practices
for adoption listed within the Commission Report. Authors of the Commission Report
recommend the following practices to be adopted by the intelligence community as a
whole and the FBI in specific:


The FBI will create and maintain through specialized training a national security
group dedicated to the prevention of terrorism. This workforce will consist of
analyst, agents, linguists, and surveillance specialists trained in intelligence and
national security.
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The FBI will train all new hires on intelligence gathering, analysis, and
dissemination. Following the broad training on intelligence and national security,
agents and analysts will specialize in one subject area.



The FBI will certify all leaders in intelligence training.



The FBI will create a management position to be filled within every field office.
This manager’s goal will be to ensure that national security priorities are carried
out amongst their local offices.



The FBI budget will align with four primary objectives: intelligence,
counterterrorism, criminal, and criminal justice.



The FBI will regularly report their progress on the aforementioned
recommendations to Congress.



Congress will make sure funding is available to the FBI when needed.

In response to the changes listed above, the U.S. government funded research for the
2014 report, “The FBI: Protecting the Homeland in the 21st Century.”111 This report
addressed the following questions: Has the FBI successfully met the above
recommendations? Have these recommendations improved the effectiveness of the FBI in
countering terrorism within the county? Are additional recommendations necessary? The
final section of this chapter summarizes this report and ends this selective history of 9/11.
FBI and Counter-Terrorism: Adapting to New Threats
This section turns to the second official report on 9/11, “The FBI: Protecting the
Homeland in the 21st Century.” In January 2014, the FBI 9/11 Review Commission was
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established in response to a congressional mandate to complete an external review of the
FBI’s implementation of the 9/11 Commission Report’s recommendations. Specifically,
the Review Commission was tasked with the following aims: (1) Assess the progress and
challenges of impending the recommendations; (2) Analyze the FBI’s response to
terrorism and domestic radicalization since 9/11; (3) Assess any information not known
to the 9/11 Commission regarding the terror attacks on 9/11; and (4) provide any
necessary additional recommendations to the FBI. This report serves as the official
response to the 9/11 Commission Report recommendation for the FBI.
The Review Commission, funded by Congress in 2013, 2014, and 2015 was
composed of Edwin Meese, former U.S. Attorney General, Tim Roemer, former
Congressman and Ambassador, and Bruce Hoffman, counterterrorism expert and
professor at Georgetown University. These members appointed former CIA Deputy
Director, John Gannon, as the Review Commission Executive Director. Together, these
four leaders completed an analysis of FBI progress concerning counterterrorism between
2001 and 2014. Additionally, the FBI Review Commission offered an evaluation of the
lessons learned from more recent terrorist attacks, an assessment of the FBI’s
preparedness for terrorism in the next decade, and an evaluation of the FBI’s current and
future needs for intelligence community partners.
For their research report, the FBI Review Commission evaluated over 60
extensive briefs from FBI headquarters, interviewed over 30 intelligence community
agents and leaders, and visited 8 FBI field offices. The report recognizes that today, the
FBI is facing a complicated threat, which “demands an accelerated commitment to
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reform.”112 The following paragraphs provide an overview of the FBI Review
Commission’s findings.
Reviewers note that three trends define current challenges facing the FBI. First,
the collapse of the Cold War world order (discussed in chapter one) resulted in the
increase of non-state terror actors. To further this challenge, lone wolf attacks following
the decrease of centralized terror networks have increased in the past few years.113
Second, a significant increase in research and development resulted in the fast-paced,
changing landscape of technology; innovations in science and technology offer terrorists
new avenues for recruitment and the carrying out of violence. Particularly, the use of
social media by terror groups has been largely noted in recent scholarship.114 Third, an
increase in domestic terror attacks has refocused resources to the state and local level.
Community police forces currently have a legitimate need for FBI intelligence
resources.115 The report notes that the FBI is successful in responding to the 9/11
Commissioner Report. However, these changes were not rapid enough and, in the years
since the 9/11 attacks, terror threats have evolved. While the recommended changes may
have been sufficient to meet the demand of Islamic terrorism as it stood in 2001, current
terrorism challenges require additional swift and ongoing changes.
Currently, the FBI assesses threats through three primary levels: the FBI
headquarters in Virginia, field offices located throughout the country, and legat attachés
(LEGATS), temporary overseas offices developed to address unique threats. The 9/11
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Review Commission offered the following list of high-level recommendations to address
each challenge within each FBI location.


The FBI must develop a multi-year strategic vision that identifies ongoing and
emerging threats. This plan should include a budget request to be approved by
Congress yearly. This budget request will overview the FBI’s plan for resource
allocation.116



The FBI must streamline and accelerate the recruitment and implementation of an
intelligence workforce.117 “Innovative thinking and efforts to identify new
threats” should be rewarded, and a clear career path for intelligence workers must
be defined.



The FBI must define more clearly the value of the LEGAT program, the FBI’s
international program. Intelligence support for LEGATs should be increased with
some LEGATs having a dedicated intelligence analyst present oversees.



Threat identification processes at field offices should be flexible enough to
incorporate new and emerging threats as they arise.

The above selective history of 9/11 commences with the 2014 FBI Review Commission’s
recommendations. These official reports of 9/11 depict the story of September 11, 2001
as complex, of diverse origin, and of ongoing significance. Thus, 9/11 as a significant
turning point in counterterrorism research, development, and practices continues to shape
our response to the demand of this historical moment.

116
117

Ibid., 70.
Ibid., 71.

59

Conclusion
Communication ethics seeks clarity on the goods protected and promoted by self
and other. On the eve of 9/11, intelligence systems were “blinking red.” Islamic
extremists had systemically planned an attack that was executed with minimal
interruption. As noted in the Commission Report, al-Qaeda was more globalized than
America, who remained committed to Cold War security practices. These practices failed
to prevent an attack on U.S. soil because they failed to take into consideration the depth
and reach of Islamic extremism. The intelligence community failed to recognize what alQaeda protected and promoted.
The 9/11 Commission notes, “Now is the time for that reflection and reevaluation.
The United States should consider what to do—the shape and objectives of a strategy.
Americans should also consider how to do it—organizing their government in a different
way.”118 As the Review Commission looked back on the effectiveness of FBI
organizational change, the group found that while many of the measures implemented in
the decade following 9/11 have proved successful, the agency still has significant room
for growth. This project argues that this growth can be grounded in communication
ethics; why should we do this.
Communication ethics in this project takes seriously the stories that shape our
communicative responses in given moments. For current and ongoing security demands,
9/11 continues to act as a pivotal and influence story that guides our communicative
response. Yet, as shown, this story is not only dynamic, it is diverse. The 9/11 terror
attacks were the culmination of various backgrounds, influences, and demands that
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coordinated together on that fateful day. The richness of 9/11 shows us counterterrorism
practices must attend to this dynamic background in order to attempt to make sense of
future directions. Threats and challenges do not exist in a vacuum. Equipping security
professional with an interpretive lens for exploring these backgrounds is a practical asset
that communication ethics literacy can provide.
To understand the value of communication ethics for counterterrorism, the
following chapter will review communication ethics literature and present the dialogic
approach to communication ethics which frames this project’s interpretive lens. Up to
this point, we have explored the changing landscape of national security and the turning
point posed by the events on September 11, 2001. With this information, the following
chapter frames the theoretical insights that will be used to apply communication ethics in
the subsequent final chapters.
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Chapter 3: Communication Ethics: The Importance of Being Literate
In this work, communication ethics is the protection and promotion of goods. The
question of terrorism reflects the struggle of communication ethics among a diverse and
mobile society. It concerns varied, distinct, and competing goods protected and promoted
by multiple groups—uncovering these goods is the challenge of counterterrorism experts.
This chapter examines the literature of communication ethics from the thesis of the
protection and promotion of differing goods and connects the reader to the hermeneutic
center of this project—taking communication ethics literacy to the past, present, and
future practices of counterterrorism. This project’s approach to communication ethics
begins with the recognition that there is conflict regarding what matters to different
persons, and communication ethics is an appropriate tool to navigate this conflict.
Becoming literate in communication ethics will assist security professionals in
interpreting intelligence in a way that offers pragmatic assistance in the research and
development of counterterrorism.
Introduction
Communication ethics takes seriously the goods, beliefs, values, and motives that
drive groups’ communicative practices. In their 2009 seminal text on communication
ethics, Ronald C. Arnett, Janie Harden Fritz, and Leeanne Bell articulate the approach to
communication ethics that guides this project. They write, “communication ethics rests at
the intersection of philosophy of communication and applied communication adding a
meaningful bridge between the communicative why and the communication how”119—
communication ethics navigates amongst conflict by restructuring one’s approach to
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communicative events. The literacy of communication ethics presented by these authors
allows for the identification of the goods guiding everyday action. In this project, I argue
that when moved into an interpretive lens for data collection, analysis, and application,
this literacy equips researchers with practical tools necessary for continued
counterterrorism practices.
Three sections guide this chapter. Section one, “Approaches to Communication
Ethics,” reviews the defining approaches in communication ethics research that shape
communication scholarship and provide background for this project’s approach—the
dialogic approach. This section situates the dialogic approach to communication amongst
multiple theoretical insights regarding communication ethics. Regarding this project, the
purpose of this section is to remind readers that multiple viewpoints and approaches to
communication ethics exist in scholarship and practice. Section two, “Communication
Ethics as Literacy and Interpretive Lens,” summarizes the literacy of communication
ethics and presents communication ethics as a real-time interpretive lens capable to
assisting persons in data discovery and analysis. This section details how communication
ethics literacy offers a practical interpretive distance between researcher and
communicative events that afford clarity and direction in future action and decisionmaking. Section three, “Communication Ethics Lens: Application,” offers readers three
ways in which this interpretive lens can be used pragmatically to understand the
counterterrorism practices of the FBI. These identified practices will guide this project’s
application in the final two chapters of this work.
Communication ethics literacy invites persons to identify, acknowledge, and learn
about the goods that shape their own and others’ actions. Being literate in communication
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ethics moves one’s focus of attention beyond the self and allows opportunities for
response and creative insight into current and ongoing emergent contentions.
Communication ethics provides us with the tools to interpretive the diverse and
competing goods that exist in our society. These tools offer practical assistance in
addressing the recommendations for improving FBI counterterrorism made in response to
9/11 and recent evolutions in terrorism threats.
Approaches to Communication Ethics
This section provides a topical overview of the key approaches to communication
ethics. Communication ethics acts as a fulcrum or meeting point between philosophy of
communication and applied communication situating communicative practices as a
reflection of what matters to particular persons/organizations.120 Since the founding of
the Communication Ethics Division of the National Communication Association in 1984,
communication ethics research has grown, coming to encompass multiple topics beyond
theoretical development to include applied conversations. Among this scholarship are six
approaches to communication ethics. The following paragraphs overview the approaches
to communication ethics recognized in our discipline’s scholarship.
In his seminal 1987 review essay of communication ethics scholarship,121 Arnett
extends the work of James Chesebro and identifies five approaches to the study of
communication ethics—democratic, procedural/code ethics, universal-humanitarian,
contextual, narrative. Arnett surveys 128 articles on communication ethics published
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between 1915 and 1985, finding that communication ethics scholarship naturally aligns
with one of the five approaches listed above. In response to this article and the defined
approaches to communication ethics, Arnett, Arneson, and Bell introduce the dialogic
approach to communication ethics in their 2006 article, “Communication Ethics: The
Dialogic Turn.”122
Each of these six approaches to communication ethics protect and promote a
particular set of communicative goods. As discussed in chapter one, communicative
goods show what matters to particular persons and organizations.123 Communicative
goods are that which one protects and promotes at all costs. These goods are supported by
communicative practices embodied and performed in a given moment as response to a
particular demand. The paragraphs below offer a brief summary of each approach.
Democratic ethics—The democratic approach to communication ethics surrounds
questions of the public process of decision-making, especially amongst diverse publics.
This approach recognizes the value of difference and dissent, while remaining committed
to debate and rational choice. Arnett recognizes the work of Karl Wallace who identified
four habits of democratic communication. These habits—habit of search, habit of justice,
habit of public and private motivation, habit of respect for dissent—protect the freedom
to find, present, and debate research. This approach promotes the process of creating and
maintaining spaces that give voice to minority publics.
Codes, procedures, and standards ethics—The codes, procedures, and standards
approach to communication ethics emphasizes a given organization’s public standard for
ethical decision-making. This approach recognizes that elected officials design and make
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public a code for handling complex situations. These codes become a standard bearer for
decision-making involving the protection of an organization’s values. This approach
protects and promotes an organization’s publicly stated mission and commitments.
Universal humanitarian ethics—The universal humanitarian approach to
communication ethics emphasizes public, a priori principles for ethical decision-making.
The a priori principles find value in the work of Immanuel Kant who articulated the
categorical imperative approach to ethics. This approach recognizes the value of
universal principles that bind persons to prescribed ethics in any and all contexts. Arnett
notes that this approach protects the value of wisdom that allow persons to navigate
culturally accepted morals.
Contextual ethics—The contextual approach to communication ethics emphasizes
the value of private discernment within particular contexts. This approach recognizes the
private self’s ability to deliberate and decide upon an appropriate response to a given
need. This approach protects individual and cultural ethics that do not have a universal
appeal. Contextual ethics recognize that persons are rooted within particular locations
that shape and guide given values for decision-making. This approach protects the
uniqueness of context and promotes a given individual’s wisdom for acting ethically.
Narrative ethics—Narrative ethics emphasize the local stories that shape our
lives, providing meaning to our decision-making. Arnett frames the narrative approach as
an alternative to the previous four approaches. He recognizes the scholarship of Alasdair
MacIntyre and Walter Fisher as founders of this approach. The narrative approach is
grounded in the agreement of a community on values that should guide ethical decision-

66

making. Rather than a rigid set of expectations, the narrative approach protects and
promotes a given community’s agreed-upon vision of action.
These five approaches provide a conceptual framework for addressing
communication ethics questions, and they provide grounding for the dialogic approach
discussed by two seminal studies on communication ethics and postmodernity: Arnett,
Arneson, and Bell and Arnett, Fritz, and Bell. These studies are more fully summarized in
future paragraphs. Extending the work of Arnett in his 1987 seminal essay, Arnett,
Arneson, and Bell survey 73 communication ethics articles published between 1986 and
2004. Their review shapes the emergence of the dialogic approach to communication
ethics. These authors frame the dialogic approach as an alternative to the previous five by
establishing an approach to communication ethics that introduces to this study a
pragmatic examination of communicative practices.124 Unlike the approaches that
precede it, the dialogic approach recognizes that each approach is valuable depending
upon the needs of a given situation. With a communication ethics literacy, we are able to
sense the particularities of a given situation and respond appropriately.
The dialogic approach to communication ethics recognizes the reality of a
postmodern moment characterized by diversity and disagreement concerning what
matters. Arnett, Arneson, and Bell explain, “The ‘dialogic turn’ [in communication ethics
scholarship] embraces [postmodernity’s] multiplicity of ‘goods,’ seeking to meet, learn
from, and negotiate with difference.”125 This approach also acknowledges that we live in
an era rich with diversity, where persons protect and promote a variety of substantial
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goods. The paragraph below offers a summary of the dialogic approach presented by
Arnett, Arneson, and Bell.
Dialogic ethics—The dialogic approach recognizes that human communication
meets ethics when a given person enacts the protection and promotion of a chosen
communicative good or set of goods. This protective action “shapes a given
communication ethic.”126 The dialogic understanding of communicative goods transforms
ethics from a study focused on the question what is ethical, to one focused on exploring
the tensions of everyday life lived amongst difference. This approach to communication
ethics protects and promotes an ethics literacy for better learning, analyzing, and making
sense of diverse and competing communicative goods. Additionally, this approach
recognizes that in each communicative event, a dialogue between and among various
goods is played out through human communication. Through attentiveness to these goods
of self and other, communicative actors navigate their commitments alongside the needs
of a given situation.
The approaches to communication ethics summarized in this section begin to
shape a communication ethics literacy. While the above approaches offer helpful tactics
for responding to particular challenges, no single approach to communication ethics in
this moment can adequately address all communicative events; no approach is all
encompassing. Amongst a diverse and mobile society where persons protect and promote
a variety of goods, being literate in communication ethics is important, and application of
this literacy in action is invaluable.
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It is important to note that literacy in this project refers to a continued
attentiveness to the metaphors that offer actors an interpretive distance for exploring,
analyzing, and responding to communicative events. A communication ethics literacy is
never complete; thus, one can never be literate across all time and space. Rather, being
literate in communication ethics is akin to learning a new language. When learning a new
language, success is based on the ability to speak and act with a new dialect in a variety
of contexts and amongst multiple people; success depends on a continued learning and
application of one’s newly acquired literacy. This project, therefore, acknowledges that
being literate in communication ethics is an ongoing task. The following section
summarizes dialogic ethics literacy outlines by Arnett, Fritz, and Bell and frames this
literacy as an interpretive toolset for continuous data collection and analysis.
Communication Ethics as Literacy and Interpretive Lens
This section outlines the dialogic approach to communication ethics and presents
this literacy as an interpretive lens. While the dialogic approach to communication ethics
responds to postmodernity, this project’s approach to ethics recognizes hypertextuality as
a significant and guiding reality of our current moment. Therefore, regarding this project
as a whole, this section grounds communication ethics literacy as attentive to
hypertextuality, defined here as the coexistence of commitments to multiple eras. As
such, this section will articulate the dialogic approach as attentive to postmodernity
followed by a discussion of applying this approach as interpretive lens with
acknowledgment of the hypertextual reality of this moment. This section is divided into
two subsections. Subsection one, Dialogic Communication Ethics as Literacy,
summarizes the dialogic literacy of communication ethics presented by Arnett, Arneson,
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and Bell and extended by Arnett, Fritz, and Bell. Subsection two, Communication-ethicsliteracy-as-interpretive-lens, identifies practices for moving this literacy into action.
Dialogic Communication Ethics as Literacy
Responding to changing landscape of communication ethic scholarship, Arnett,
Arneson, and Bell present the “dialogic turn” in ethics in their 2006 article
“Communication Ethics: The Dialogic Turn.”127 This introductory work on dialogic
ethics transforms the study of communication ethics from the application of a singular
communication ethic to a “postmodern reality of a multiplicity of communication
ethics.”128 This recognition of multiple communication ethics transcends the five
approaches (democratic, universal-humanitarian, contextual, codes, procedures, and
standards, narrative) acknowledged by Arnett in his article, “The Status of
Communication Ethics Scholarship.” The dialogic turn recognizes that communicative
actors are each situated upon a given ground. As such, within every communicative event
exists multiple communicative goods.
This approach to communication ethics acknowledges the work of postmodern
writers, notably Jean-Francois Lyotard. Lyotard’s work rejects the modern assumption
that there exists a universal understanding of ethics via Truth. Rather, we live amongst
multiple petite narratives where truth is dependent upon the ground of the communicative
actor.129 Communication ethics amongst postmodern petite narratives recognizes the
existence of multiple communicative goods in each communicative event. Due to the

127

Ibid.
Ibid., 62.
129
See Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1984). For a discussion of petite narratives and communication ethics, see
Ronald C. Arnett, “The Fulcrum Dialogue: Monologue, Worldview, and Acknowledgment.”
128

70

presence of multiple communicative goods, dialogic communication ethics invites
attentiveness to difference. This attentiveness encompasses learning from others and the
creative possibilities that emerge when one meets these differences in communication.
Dialogic ethics also presupposes competition between persons in communication.
This competition manifests through each persons’ commitments to multiple, competing
communicative goods. The dialogic approach protects and promotes the necessity of
knowing the goods that shape one’s own commitments while being open to learning
about an other’s commitment to goods. This learning is made possible by communication
ethics literacy, which consists of communication ethics metaphors.
Communication ethics metaphors provide a “fuzzy clarity” on communicative
events.130 Metaphors provide us with a scope through which we can explore
communicative events with an interpretive distance resistant to overshadowing the event
with one’s own biases or predetermined findings. Metaphors acts as the literacy of this
approach to communication ethics, providing researchers with a language for exploring
events with decreased limitations. Communication ethics metaphors are abundant.
However, the metaphors of historical moment, narrative, communicative goods, and
attentiveness to multiplicity drive this project.
The literacy of communication ethics is presented in the 2009 book,
Communication Ethics Literacy: Dialogue and Difference, by Arnett, Fritz, and Bell.
This text frames the dialogic approach as tied to the enactment of communicative
goods—those values requiring protection at all costs.131 The literacy of communication
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ethics encompasses narrative ground, communicative goods, and learning amongst
difference. While these terms have been used in a preliminary fashion throughout this
project thus far, the following paragraphs offer an extended summary of these key terms.
Historical moment—Historical moments are defined by the emerging questions
that shape a given period of time. “How once responds to these questions their identity.132
Alasdair MacIntyre discusses the importance of historical moments in his text A Short
History of Ethics.133 Throughout his text, MacIntyre shows that meaning and ethics are
not universal but rather always tied to a given time and locale. Attentiveness to historical
moments reminds us that we cannot examine communicative events apart from the
communicative context in which they exist. One’s embeddedness in a given historical
moment is a significant factor in shaping communicative action. Historical moments are
responsive to the past, present, and future demands that call on communicative actors to
respond.
Narrative—Narratives are the stories, persons, and goods that provide meaning to
our communicative practices. Narratives are situated by publicly agreed upon stories that
tell us why goods are important, giving meaning to the practices that protect and promote
a set of communicative goods.134 Narratives act as human ground offering a meaningful
“center” or dwelling place that guides human action. Narratives also shape the way we
view the world, and act as embedded monologue to one’s belief, worldviews, and
identity. Narratives situate persons within given communities with particular histories or
monologues. Recognition of this monologue is the first step in understanding an other as
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“embedded communicative agent” who thinks, acts, and communicates based upon a
particular view of the world.
Narratives provide a frame for making meaning in our lives. They also shape our
worldview. When one understands that narratives shape our own view of the world, it
becomes clear that we explore the actions of others from a specific standpoint. Clarity on
the stories that shape our narrative as well as the background motivators that shape the
narratives of others, allows one to witness the multiple communicative goods present in
each communicative event.
Communicative goods—The dialogic approach to communication ethics is
characterized by the protection and promotion of communicative goods.135
Communicative goods are those values protected and promoted by given persons at all
costs. These goods shape the decision-making of groups as they act as a rhetorical guide
for communication practices. Communicative goods have two components. The first
component is the substantive good to be protected and promoted. The second component
is the communicative practices enacted to protect and promote the substantial good.136.
The communicative practices characterize communication ethics as pragmatic and
responsive; communicative practices are embodied and performed in a given moment in
response to a given situation.
Understanding which goods groups protect and promote and how these groups
protect and promote provides insight into the motivations and commitments that define
what matters to given persons. Identity is shaped by how persons or groups respond to the
needs before them, this response is often guided by one’s commitment to a particular set
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of communicative goods.137 As a key term in the literacy of dialogic communication
ethics, this articulation of communicative goods allows researchers to move the focus of
attention beyond personal interpretations of given actions toward the understanding of
motivated decision-making. The recognition of communicative goods provides us with a
textured entrance into the values, commitments, and practices of given groups.
Multiplicity and Difference—The dialogic approach to communication ethics
recognizes difference between and among persons as ever-present. Attentive to
postmodernity as an era defined by multiple petite narratives, the dialogic approach
understands that “a single communication ethic . . . no longer exists.”138 Rather,
differences and disagreements center upon what one defines as requiring protection and
promotion. The meeting of multiple and, at times, competing goods between persons
requires that communicators negotiate difference.
The dialogic approach to communication ethics is ever attentive to the richness
and multiplicity of difference in a postmodern moment and moves away from prescribing
or describing what is ethical, explicating the importance of learning how different
persons or groups define what is important and what requires protection and promotion.
Communication ethics as literacy is a practical and important tool for navigating conflict
is a moment rich with diversity.
Communication ethics literacy invites persons to identify, acknowledge, and learn
about the goods that shape their own and others’ actions. Being attentive to the
communicative goods, narrative ground, and difference between communicators opens
new avenues for analysis. The following subsection presents the core of this project—
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how a communication ethics literacy can be used pragmatically as an interpret lens for
data collection and analysis.
Communication-ethics-literacy-as-interpretive-lens
The following paragraphs address the primary aim of this project—articulating
the dialogic literacy of communication ethics as an interpretive lens for data collection
and analysis. When used as a tool for data analysis, the literacy of communication ethics
provides us with an intellectual distance for exploring and navigating difference. This
distance allots creative insight into conflicts that are stalled or overwhelming. As an
interpretive lens, communication ethics literacy recognizes human action and decisionmaking as situated within a given narrative and reflective of the commitments protected
and promoted by a unique and specific view of the world.139 My presentation of
communication ethics as an interpretive lens is made in reflection of the work of Hans
Georg Gadamer who discussed interpretation as philosophical hermeneutics and the work
of Arnett who bridged Gadamer’s sentiments with this approach to communication
ethics.140 Additionally, communication-ethics-literacy-as-interpretive-lens acknowledges
the hypertextual nature of our current moment defined by Umberto Eco and integrated
into communication ethic scholarship by Arnett.141
For the importance of communication ethics literacy, Gadamer’s work shapes an
approach to philosophical hermeneutics that embeds interpreters within a given historical
moment. Philosophical hermeneutics works with the assumption that texts, understood
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here as communicative events, bring life and new meaning to given contexts. This
approach to interpretation is attentive to this acknowledging that findings are not final
answers, but findings for a given time and place. Arnett discusses the influence of
Gadamer on communication ethics as resting on the understanding of meaning as situated
within a horizon of authenticity. Meaning is made in the communicative events that shape
a life.142 To interpret communicative events, it is necessary to understand the
communicative context in which a person is situated. Meaning does not take shape in a
vacuum. Rather, attentiveness to the persons, goods, and motives that shape a given
artifact and event are of utmost importance. An interpreter always walks a thin line
between making sense of a given artifact and imposing undue significance onto an event.
Successful interpretation walks along a horizon of authenticity. Dialogic communication
ethics works along this horizon. The following paragraphs briefly overview Gadamer’s
work to display the significant of this sentiment for this project.
Gadamer’s Wahrheid und Methode (Truth and Method), published in 1960, is
guided by the following question: how can hermeneutics do justice to understanding once
it is freed from the scientific understanding of ontology? For Gadamer, understanding is
not a grasping of objects themselves, but a grasping of objects through their history.143
Gadamer suggested that hermeneutics, the study of interpretation, had historically been
understood as a scientific inquiry or approach to understanding a text. In Truth and
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Method, he asks, whether there is a method to understanding. Responding to the work of
Martin Heidegger, Gadamer acknowledges the importance of acknowledging one’s biases
as one approaches a given text.
Gadamer finds that understanding with and through biases is not an objective task
and that these biases do not disappear. Rather, the process of identifying biases allows
one to locate the origin of these foreprojections in a way that increases understanding of
one’s own point of reflection.144 The task of the reader, he writes, is to examine their own
literacy as they work to understand the intent of the original author.145 An interpreter,
thus, does justice to a communicative event by questioning rather than finding;
interpretation begins with an openness to learn.
Openness to learning with, from, and alongside a communicative event begins
with an acknowledgement of one’s own biases and commitment to discovering the
communicative context surrounding an event. One gains interpretive authority as one
engages events with insights grounded in reflection and recognition of the
communicative context. This authority of understanding never seeks to control or own a
communicative event. Rather, it secures a ground off of which genuine understanding or
interpretation can push. When we approach an event with an openness to learn, we shift
our focus of attention away from finding answers toward opening opportunities for new
and creative insight. Where answers limit, successful interpretation pushes boundaries.
The importance of Gadamer’s work for this project’s presentation of
communication ethics as an interpretive lens rests on this idea of the fusion of horizons.
An interpreter is always already interpreting based upon the ground upon which they
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stand. Without recognizing the biases of this context, interpretations can be made in vain,
without adequate care for the communicative person, event, or artifact. Dialogic
communication ethics recognizes this horizon as the communicative context or historical
moment that shapes the questions that guide lives. This context shapes the background
sentiments that come to play in foreground communicative action. The following
paragraphs shape this interpretive lens in reflection of Gadamer’s work.
Bringing the study of communication ethics to current and ongoing
communicative events illuminates the nature of conflicts in a moment both rich with
diversity and riddled with disagreements. Arnett argues that postmodernity, characterized
by hypertextuality146—the existence of multiple historical moments and their
corresponding communicative goods in any one moment—necessitates the study of
communication ethics in conflict because it “unmasks” the multiple biased grounds
present in a given conflict.147 When conflict is viewed through communication ethics
attentive to hypertextuality, the focus of attention moves past the conventional
understandings of a conflict, exploring the multiple perspectives energizing and
responding to this conflict.
The literacy of communication ethics, when brought to conflicts of this nature,
provides a framework for interpretation.148 As discussed in the previous chapter, the
evolution of terrorism results in difficult and demanding counterterrorism issues.
Attentiveness to the literacy of communication ethics amongst conflict acknowledges the
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communicative gestalt interplay between background sentiments comprised of the
narratives, communicative goods, and communicative practices of communicative actors
and foreground competition between and among communicative goods.149 While
foreground struggles may be transparent; research, investigating, and learning is required
to uncover the competing background communication ethics motivating the foreground
disagreements. This background data analysis is aided in creative and beneficial ways
when the literacy of communication ethics is applied.
The recognition of conflict as a gestalt allows us to move dialogic communication
ethics literacy into an interpretive lens. Communication ethics attentive to a gestalt
understanding of conflict recognizes that in order to understand conflict, we must move
our focus of attention beyond the immediate state of conflict in the foreground in an
attempt to identify and learn about the driving commitments in the background. These
background commitments, shaped by particular narratives and the protection of a set of
communicative goods, are uncovered when researchers take seriously the communicative
commitments of their subjects. For counterterrorism experts, this means data analysts
must acknowledge the commitments of terrorists as valid for communicative action—a
task not easily accepted. As an interpretive lens, the literacy of dialogic communication
ethics is performed as persons are attentive and open to learning from competing
communicative goods. The enactment of this literacy is outlined below:


Attentiveness to narrative ground: The agreed upon stories that make up the
narratives guide one’s communicative action. These stories are often complex and
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span great distances in time and across places. One’s narrative commitments exist
in the background, and, when left uncovered, foreground communicative action
may be deemed irrational or unexpected. Uncovering the narrative grounds upon
which decision-making finds its meaning aids researchers in better understanding
and predicting current and future communicative action. This uncovering begins
with background research addressing the communities, family, public and private
affiliations to which a person attends. Further, it is important to remember that in
this postmodern moment characterized by hypertextuality, people have multiple
narrative grounds. Being attentive to this multitude of grounds is necessary.
Attending to multiple narrative grounds opens new research possibilities. For
instance, research may uncover that a given person is highly committed to a given
religious affiliation. However, if research is only focused only on this narrative,
researchers may fail to uncover the importance of other commitments in
predicting communicative action. Navigating the multiple grounds and
commitments of research subjects textures insights in a way that opens new
avenues for discovery.


Attentiveness to communicative goods: Arnett, Fritz, and Bell argue that narrative
ground serves as a “voice or articulateness to a good or set of goods.”150 By
attending to one’s narrative commitments, one can uncover the goods protected
and promoted through communicative practices. Yet, it is important to recognize
that researchers work form their own narrative grounds. Thus, biases and
assumptions regarding others’ goods may be overlooked. Analysis cannot end
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with the identification of the goods guiding one’s action. Rather, researches must
continuously explore and learn about these goods beyond their own
interpretations. While two persons may protect and promote the same good, the
commutative practices they embody to do so will differ.


Attentiveness to multiplicity and difference: Hypertextuality, the co-presence of
goods emerging from historical moments, reminds us that goods transform over
time.151 One’s interpretation and commitment to a given communicative good is
negotiated and renegotiated over time. Thus, researchers must remain committed
to uncovering the background sentiments that guide action as this background will
transform in time. Being attentive to these changing goods requires ongoing
alertness to the dynamics of a given situation and ongoing openness to learning.

Attentiveness to the metaphors of narrative, goods, and multiplicity shape an interpretive
lens that afford professionals a guide for engaging research. This literacy as interpretive
lens reminds researchers to reflect continuously on the complex and changing aspects of
communicative events so as to avoid missing gaps in research.
Communication Ethics Lens: Application
Communication ethics in this project finds value in exploring significant, ongoing
issues with recognition that this area of study provides a practical framework for
exploring and engaging difference. The theoretical heart of this approach to
communication ethics moves the focus of attention beyond “reductive and abstract
engagement to experience of the subject matter before us.”152 The final section offers
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three practices for applying this interpretive lens to counterterrorism efforts of the FBI.
Applying the literacy of communication ethics is not a new task. This application works
in reflection of communication ethics applications that have come before it. These
scholarly applications provide direction and legitimacy to this project as a whole. I
outline a selection of these applications briefly below.


Ronald C. Arnett, Janie Harden Fritz, and Leeanne Bell use communication ethics
literacy to understand Victor Hugo’s Les Misérables. Arnett, Fritz, and Bell
explore the novel through the viewpoint of competing ethical goods. They find
that “Les Misérables is an ongoing interplay of goods that shaped and transformed
lives in a particular historical moment.”153 Applying the metaphor of goods in a
moment of conflicting ethical goods shows that the protection and promotion of
goods shapes one’s ethical life.



Ronald C. Arnett interprets the work of Hannah Arendt with communication
ethics in Communication Ethics in Dark Times: Hannah Arendt’s Rhetoric of
Warning and Hope.154 Using Arendt’s historical moment of modernity as a
starting point, Arnett finds that Arendt’s scholarship poses a communication
ethics response that resists modernity’s attempts to overrun reality with imposed
obligations and solutions.
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Arnett, McManus, and McKendree use communication ethics literacy to explore
The Odyssey.155 These authors apply communication ethics metaphors to reflect
on the multiple conflicts presented in Homer’s classical work.

Like these works that have come before, this project attempts to apply communication
ethics literacy to communicative events. Where this work differs is in the prospects of
applying this literacy in real-time as to open new avenues for research and foreshadow
events to come.
Real-time application of communication ethics begins with recognition of one’s
own and Other’s narrative ground, communicative goods, and openness to learning. This
attentiveness expands avenues for exploring current research and future possibilities. As a
key artifact in counterterrorism, the FBI provides an exemplar of how the literacy of
communication ethics can be applied to offer creative openings for new avenues of
practice. The following paragraph outlines this application.
Metaphors provide a level of clarity into a given situation that shapes a possibility
for opening new avenues for counterterrorism research and development. Attentiveness
to the metaphors that guide this project—narrative, communicative goods, and
multiplicity—begins with situating the communicative context of events within their
historical moment. Application of communication-ethics-literacy-as-interpretive-lens for
this project, therefore, begins by framing the current communicative context of
counterterrorism. With knowledge of the communicative context, one can address the
challenges of terrorism with tools and practices that are grounded in current context,
capabilities, and limitations. From there, researchers can locate with better clarity specific
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areas in FBI counterterrorism practices that can benefit from a communication ethics
lens. Using the communicative context of counterterrorism situated within our current
historical moment as a guide, this communication ethics lens offers connections between
communication ethics metaphors and counterterrorism. Attentiveness to narrative as the
ground which hosts the stories, persons, and goods that shape meaning and decisionmaking in everyday life thus becomes a pragmatic tool for counterterrorism research and
development. Finally, with clarity on embedded communicative actors and the narrative
grounds shaping motives, good, and practices, this communication ethics lens can offer a
set of practical practices that both acknowledges the limits of our hypertextual moment
and embeds creative insights into the intelligence process.
This project understands terrorism as a communicative gestalt fueled by diverse
background sentiments. While application of communication ethics literacy happens in
current time, researchers must remain attentive to the background knowledge and
experience that have fostered new insights in counterterrorism. Therefore, this project’s
application begins by examining the current failures, challenges, and opportunities of FBI
counterterrorism. The application continues by addressing the recommended practices for
continued improvement and growth of the organization. The application ends by
identifying current and suspected future challenges the organization will face and
detecting research tools for better data collection and analysis.
This work’s applications of communication ethics literacy spans the final two
chapters of this project. The final two chapters of this work will address this
communication ethics literacy as lens application. This interpretive lens acknowledges
the existence of multiple and competing goods in each communicative event and takes
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seriously the multiplicity of background commitments that drive human action. In
summary, this lens allows us to recognize the value of communication ethics as tied to
being literate. This approach to communication ethics is not tied to a theory; rather, the
interpretive lens offers a pragmatic examination of communicative practices. The
dialogic approach to communication ethics establishes this literature, and performing this
literacy provides us with an interpretive lens for data collection and analysis. The
following chapter will explore this lens in reflection of the current issues facing the FBI.
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Chapter 4: Communicative Context: Counterterrorism in this Historical Moment
In order to apply communication ethics literacy, we must first situate the
communicative context of counterterrorism. This chapter frames the communicative
context of counterterrorism in this historical moment. This chapter also begins to frame
the application portion of this project by establishing specific areas in FBI
counterterrorism practices that can benefit from a communication ethics lens. The
purpose of this chapter is to offer the FBI as a key artifact in the battle against terrorism
in this moment. As discussed thus far, communication ethics literacy assists researchers
by providing an interpretive lens through which they can better identify the
commitments, motivators, and aims of communicative actor—all of which are shaped by
a given historical moment. With communication ethics literacy, we can enrich findings
for future improvements and explore current issues with an intellectual distance capable
of uncovering new findings. Recognizing the FBI as a key artifact in counterterrorism,
this chapter becomes an exemplar of how the literacy of communication ethics can
sustain creative opportunities for new avenues of practice. With this communicative
context, the final application chapter will interpret these findings using communication
ethics metaphors.
Introduction
This work argues that communication ethics literacy as an interpretive lens offers
pragmatic insights for security professionals charged with detecting and responding to
terror attacks. Communication ethics provides us with the tools to interpret the diverse
and competing goods that exist in our society; these tools are the communication ethics
metaphors that, when applied to current and ongoing events, offer an interpretive distance

86

for research and development. These tools offer practical assistance in addressing the
recommendations for improving FBI counterterrorism made in response and reflection on
9/11. When applied to past events, communication ethics offers researchers a tool for
widening past research on security policy and finding new areas for inquiry.
Communication ethics literacy acknowledges one’s embeddedness in a given
historical moment as a significant factor in shaping communicative action. Historical
moments are responsive to the past, present, and future demands that call on
communicative actors to respond. Our current historical moment situates the
communicative context of counterterrorism as one void of simplicity. Additionally, our
current historical moment is one characterized by the existence of multiple and
competing communicative goods. “Each communicator protects and promoted a given
good through communicative action.”156 This communicative action is shaped in
response to the particular historical moment, which, in this approach to communication
ethics, is understood as the major questions that shape our given time. To identify the
practical and significant contributions that communication ethics makes to
counterterrorism and the FBI, we must first understand the emerging questions and
demands that shape our historical moment and the communicative context of
counterterrorism.
This chapter elucidates the communicative context of counterterrorism in this
historical moment. To do so, it presents past, present, and future counterterrorism FBI
challenges. Three sections guide this first application chapter. Section one,
“Communicative Context: Understanding Past Challenges,” articulates the identified
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failures of the FBI security practices and overviews the Bureau’s organizational response,
identifying the major questions that continue to shape counterterrorism. Section two,
“Communicative Context: Exploring Current Challenges,” identifies and reviews current
demanding challenges facing the FBI, identifying the questions that shape contemporary
counterterrorism challenges. Section three, “Communicative Context: Exploring Future
Challenges,” overviews the proposed future security challenges the FBI will face,
identifying the questions that will shape counterterrorism efforts in the near future.
Within each section, the major questions, challenges, or demands regarding
counterterrorism are identified. These questions, challenges, and demands emerge from,
and help researchers to identify, the current historical moments.
Apart from the Commission Report, this chapter leverages for-public releases by
the FBI, unclassified FBI documents, and speeches by FBI leaders, often times using
direct quotations from these sources. This primary literature provides an intimate look
into the FBI as an organization growing, adapting, and responding to the needs a given
moment. In addition, other scholarly sources are used to texture and provide clarity to
FBI statements.
As an interpretive lens, communication ethics literacy finds value in providing an
interpretive distance that allots better clarity on communicative events of the past,
present, and future. When the pragmatic value of applying communication ethics to
counterterrorism challenges is acknowledged, tools for incorporating this interpretive lens
into future analytics can be developed. In order to apply communication ethics literacy,
we must first establish the major questions that shape our current moment and demand a
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counterterrorism response. The following section provides an expanded overview of past
FBI challenges and failures.
Communicative Context: Understanding Past Challenges
This section expands on the FBI failures prior to 9/11 and explores the systemic
changes implemented by the FBI in the wake of these findings in order to initiate
application of communication ethics literacy. Interpreting past conclusions using
communication ethics metaphors offers a new way to explore findings. These
interpretations cast light on data, opening new avenues for engagement. Communication
ethics allows us to think differently, think beyond what has already been found. With this
insight, security professionals can continue to enrich data.
The failures identified by the Commission Report offer a starting point for
addressing past, current, and future FBI challenges. The Commission Report identified
failures of imagination, policy, capabilities, and management regarding counterterrorism,
the FBI, and the September 11 attacks. The following paragraphs offer an extended read
of these failures in order to frame the FBI responses to these failures.
Responding to Old Failures and New Directives
Today’s FBI is the result of structural changes implemented in response to the
9/11 attacks and in the wake of evolving terrorism threats to the U.S. After 9/11 and the
Commission Report, U.S. leadership implemented structural changes to reorganize U.S.
national security agencies. For the FBI, this meant large scale, centralized changes. The
directives, goals, organization of offices, and training initiatives were overhauled in
response to the failures identified by the Commission Report. These sweeping changes
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“challenged both the design and identity of the FBI in fundamental ways.”157 Arguably,
the most significant change regarding the FBI after 9/11 was the shift in mission from
solving domestic crimes after they occurred to the prevention of future terror attacks
before they occurred.158 Operationally, this change foreshadowed a need for
counterintelligence personnel and resources. Changes in the objective of the FBI required
changes in the organizational structure. The top-down implementation of change invites
questions regarding how the Bureau adapted to this overhaul while also adapting to new
identified goals. For the Bureau, failures noted in the Commission Report’s offered a
starting point for designing these changes.
As noted previously in this project, the Commission Report identified the
following failures regarding the FBI: imagination, policy, capabilities, and
management.159 The organizational response to these failures shape the Bureau as it is
today. Exploring these failures in light of the structural changes within the FBI opens
ways for thinking about the value of applying communication ethics literacy. The
following paragraphs review these identified failures offering additional insights and
greater clarity concerning past FBI failures.
Imagination—Regarding imagination, the Commission recommended the
following practices: (1) brainstorm about how attacks may be carried out; (2) identify
telltale indications that a surprise attack is being planned; (3) collect intelligence on the
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indicators when possible; and (4) integrate defense mechanisms to stop or alert to the
most deadly attacks.160 Significantly, the Commission noted that, looking back upon the
events of 9/11, telltale signs that an imminent terror attack using planes as weapons were
visible but overlooked by security professionals. The question remained as to how and
why these signs were overlooked. Per the Commission’s findings, security professionals
failed to recognize the magnitude of opportunity terrorists had in terms of resources.
Additionally, security professionals limited their research to more current, pressing issues
and failed to understand the reality of a large-scale attack; security professionals could
not imagine the possibility of another Pearl Harbor like surprise attack on U.S. soil. The
focus on current issues at the sacrifice of future planning allowed these professionals to
overlook the signs that a plan of this nature was underway. Responding to the failure of
imagination, the Commission offered a list of specific practices that resulted in what they
term the failure to institutionalize imagination.
Per the commission, “institutionalizing imagination” begins with addressing the
following past failures:
1. Security professionals failed to explore opportunities from the enemy’s
perspective. This type of red team analysis—a strategy of playing devil’s
advocate and exploring the opposition’s strategies for decision making—could
have increased awareness regarding the capabilities of large-scale suicide
attacks.161
2. Security professionals failed to develop telltale signs regarding terror attacks.
While this list of telltale signs is difficult to develop if awareness concerning
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capabilities is nonexistent, this tactic finds value in taking the perspective of the
enemy. With greater care concerning the objectives, goals, and practices of the
enemy, security professionals could identify tactics that are out of line with the
normal practices of these groups. Such identification could trigger a warning and
thus instigate further analysis.162
3. Leadership failed to communicate expectations regarding the above mention
telltale signs. Without this set of expectations, the “potential significance” of such
signs were overlooked.163 Personnel were unable to connect the dots between and
among signs of an impending attack.
4. Security professionals failed to institute broad security practices for future threats.
There existed security practices for current and credible threats, but practices
regarding unplanned for, future threats were not institutionalized.
These identified failures speak to the need to institutionalize imagination. As a whole,
they also encompass the failures of policy, capabilities, and management discussed
below.
Policy—Regarding policy, the Commission recommended that research regarding
possible threats be coordinated among all security organizations and be carried out
thoroughly. Each security organization within the U.S. has limits to what they can
achieve in terms of intelligence gathering and preparation for attacks. The ability to move
quickly on threats in a coordinated fashion was limited prior to 9/11. Specifically,
arguing for the spending of resources against a threat that was not yet validated proved
difficult.
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Prior to 9/11, the FBI’s focus centered on domestic crimes. This area of law
enforcement worked apart from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), who were
primarily charged with counterterrorism intelligence. Directives were identified and
coordinated within each local field office, and broad-based directives delivered from
headquarters were limited. Without a formal policy concerning communication, goals,
and collaboration, opportunities for research closed. Thinking beyond the local level of
threats, resources, and security needs created silos of security personnel who either could
not see value in collaboration, or who were not offered areas where collaboration could
effectively take place between office and organizations.
Capabilities—Regarding capabilities, the Commission noted that the FBI failed to
link intelligence and agent knowledge to national threats,164 and the lack of
communication and sharing of intelligence between agencies resulted in security gaps
and intelligence overlaps. Per the commission, boundaries between security organizations
limited the free sharing of intelligence. Without the sharing of intelligence, professionals
who argued for an increased focus on terrorism found it difficult to plead their case as
other professionals were not aware of these threats. Additionally, communication
amongst FBI offices was limited. Therefore, a coordinated effort at identifying security
threats and implementing training efforts did not exist. Organizational boundaries and
limited access to intelligence sharing created gaps in acknowledging terrorism as a direct
threat to the U.S.
Prior to 9/11, there were limited spaces for intelligence experts within the FBI.
Those who worked in intelligence were placed at FBI headquarters. Field offices did not
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have intelligence analysts and instead were housed by special agents. Without
intelligence training, special agents were unable to link data to national threats, missing
key opportunities to discover implications of an impending terror threat.
Management—The Commission found that managerial coordination and
communication regarding the goal of counterterrorism failed. The Commission Report
contextualizes this failure thusly:
However the specific problems are labeled, we believe they are symptoms of the
government’s broader inability to adapt how it manages problems to the new
challenge of the twenty-first century. The agencies are like a set of specialists in
the hospital, each ordering tests, looking for symptoms and prescribing
medications. What is missing is the attending physician who makes sure they
work as a team.165
There was no central command to communicate the roles and security needs to various
organizations. For the FBI specifically, field offices fell victim to varying goals and
objectives. Resource allocation to counterterrorism intelligence was limited. Across the
board of security organizations, goals differed as well.
Taken together, these failures highlight the inability to explore the possibilities of
new threats and work in a coordinated manner to address threats. Responses to these
failures urged security professionals to reimagine both why and how persons terrorize.
Additionally, they urged professionals to challenge their assumptions regarding
background influences on terrorism and work across organizational lines to address
emerging threats. Upon identifying threats, the Commission urged organizations to
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coordinate resources to address future violence. “Insight for the future is thus not easy to
apply in practice. It is hardest to mount a major effort while a problem still seems
minor.”166 Success in mobilizing policy rests on finding opportunities to engage common
goals amongst multiple organizations.
In response to these threats, the FBI implemented structural changes to their
organization, leadership, and training. These changes attempted to address the failures of
imagination, capabilities, policy, and management while staying prepared and ready to
meet the demands of emerging threats. The following subsection provides an overview
these structural changes.
Organizational Responses to Commission Identified Failures
The FBI responded to recommendations made within the Commission Report by
aligning their organizational goals around the development of five branches—National
Security, Criminal Investigations, Science and Technology, the Office of the Chief
Information Officer, and Human Sources. Within the National Security branch were the
Counterterrorism Division, Counter Intelligence Division, Directorate of Intelligence, and
the Directorate of Weapons of Mass Destruction. These structural changes aligned with
large-scale changes to national security as a whole. Additionally, this new structure
decentered criminal investigation as a primary goal allowing space for intelligence and
counterterrorism initiatives.
To grasp how vast the structural changes were within the FBI, it is necessary to
reflect on how the FBI was organized prior to 9/11. Colleagues at the Harvard Business
School, Ranjay Gulati, Jan Rivkin, and Ryan Raffaeili explore the changes in the FBI
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between 2001 and 2016. The authors write that between the founding of the Bureau in
1908 and the September 11, 2001 attacks, the FBI built its organization around the goal
of law enforcement. FBI offices were situated locally amongst 56 major cities within the
U.S., where most domestic crime occurred. FBI Headquarters provided “light-handed,
advisory coordination,” and field office leadership led their local office according to the
geographic demands where they were located. Coordination against large-scale crimes
was led by the “office of origin,” or the field office that first began researching the case.
In 2001, the FBI assigned nearly 76% of agents to criminal cases, 21% of agents to
intelligence, and approximately 2% of agents to counterterrorism.167 Gulati, Rivkin, and
Ruffaeli find that until 2001, the FBI’s primary objective amongst security organizations
in the U.S. was to enforce domestic laws after a crime had occurred. This objective was
drastically reformatted following the 9/11 attacks.
The Director of the FBI at the time of the attacks, Robert Mueller, describes the
structural changes to FBI organization as divided into three phases, which are overviewed
below.


Phase one, triage, involved direct responses to the attacks. During this phase,
national security objectives were separated from criminal law enforcement and
direction was centralized at the FBI Headquarters. The “office of origin” directive
was diminished. Additionally, FBI personnel developed relationships with local
police forces to coordinate intelligence sharing and plan attack responses (during
this time, FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces increased from 35 to 66).168
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Phase two, search, described the founding and development of intelligence.
Cleared of the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Mueller focused on
building a program for intelligence capable of ensuring national security. During
this time, Mueller created the Director of Intelligence position to develop a
pathway for FBI offices to analyze threats, identify gaps in research, and allocate
resources to the greatest threat. To aid intelligence, analysts were placed at each
FBI Field Office.169



Phase three, crystallization, described the implementation of intelligence as a key
focus of FBI work. During this period, intelligence and national security practices
were aligned with criminal investigation to create a unified approach to FBI goals.

Together, the implementation of these structural changes characterize the organization of
the FBI as it stands today.
Currently, the FBI has field offices in 56 cities throughout the U.S., 355 satellite
offices, a headquarters in Virginia including the FBI Academy, the FBI Engineering
Research Facility, and the FBI Laboratory, a fingerprint identification complex in West
Virginia, and the Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (TEDAC) in Alabama.170
The FBI also has 63 Legal Attaché (LEGAT) offices and 27 sub-offices in 75 countries
around the world. LEGAT offices are temporary dispatches that respond to global threats.
At the core of these offices is the FBI Headquarters, which provides centralized
operations, policy, and administrative support. Whereas prior to the 9/11 attacks, the FBI
was focused on domestic crime with little resources dedicated to terrorism, this
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organization situates the FBI as a primary resource in preventing and responding to
terrorism.
Additionally, FBI resource allocation is now divided among four units—
Intelligence, Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence, Criminal Enterprises and Federal
Crimes, and Criminal Justice Services. Resources are allocated to these units based upon
the FBI’s core mission, workload, and necessary administrative support. Apart from these
units, the FBI allocates resources to support current and emerging threats to the U.S. and
its interests. These allocations are at the discretion of the Director, who identifies and
prioritizes threats.
The reorganization of the FBI to address the failures identified by the
Commission accomplished three objectives. First, the FBI created processes for
establishing accountability regarding intelligence. No longer did the sole focus of the
Bureau rest on law enforcement. Intelligence became a primary directive of the Bureau.
Second, the FBI aligned national security objectives with the organizational goals of the
Bureau. FBI Headquarters centralized the direction for these goals and communicated the
primary goals and threats to each field office. Third, FBI leadership developed
communication pathways between field offices and local law enforcement to understand
the local threat and coordinate plans for future large-scale attacks. This sharing of
resources opened a line of communication to align national goals with local concerns.
Still, even with excellent analytics, coordinated communicative practices, and an endless
supply of resources, the FBI cannot predict all violence and terror attacks. The current
and ongoing threat of terrorism continues to evolve, transforming national security
challenges and directions. As these threats evolve, past failures and areas for inquiry
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resurface as significant questions needing continued reflection. The following paragraphs
identify the questions that continue to shape counterterrorism responses in our current
moment. These questions are as follows:
1. How can imagination be an ongoing and necessary component of terrorism
prevention in order to preempt future capabilities, policy, and management
failures?
2. How can the FBI adapt with future organizational responses and structural
changes as new threats emerge and current threats evolve?
These questions characterize the past concerns that continue to shape the current
communicative context of counterterrorism. This application as a whole will continue to
reflect upon these questions.
This section overviewed the failures of the FBI prior to 9/11 and discussed the
structural changes put into place by FBI leadership to address these failures. Exploring
these past failures has allowed the questions that continue to shape the communicative
context of counterterrorism in this moment to emerge. While time has allowed reflection
and structural changes to take place, the FBI continues to respond to past challenges and
the call to attend to the identified questions remains. In response, the identified two
questions will shape the application of communication ethics literacy in the pages to
come. Following suit, the next section explores current threats identified by FBI
leadership as demanding of our attention and resources.
Communication Ethics Context: Exploring Current Challenges
Section one overviewed past security failures and their subsequent FBI responses
in order to identify the emerging questions that continue to shape this moment’s
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communicative context of counterterrorism. This section explores current terrorism
challenges identified by FBI leadership as today’s most demanding issues. This section
identifies the current and ongoing challenges that demand a response in this historical
moment. The following list outlines the topics to be discussed in this section:
1. Alongside changes in technology, the use of social media by terror organizations
to increase followers and promote violence is steadily increasing. These
innovations in science and technology offer terrorist groups expanded
opportunities for planning attacks and recruiting new followers.171
2. Alongside the increased use of social media by terror groups, the FBI noted an
increase in lone wolf attacks. Specifically, the increase in lone wolf attacks has
corresponded with the decrease of centralized terror networks.172
These current challenges, which have come to shape FBI counterterrorism practices in
the most recent years leading up to 2018, give rise to the current questions demanding
FBI attention.
In his 2017 remarks for the Global Coalition Working to Defeat ISIS, U.S. Secretary
of State Rex Tillerson noted “A ‘digital caliphate’ should not flourish in place of a
physical one” as “the internet is ISIS’s best weapon for turning a recruit into a selfradicalized attacker.”173 As travel to ISIS locations such as Iraq and Syria have become
increasingly difficult, ISIS messages via social media have called for followers to both
create local networks and carry out attacks in their home states. Tillerson’s remarks
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reflect on the unique challenges facing counterterrorism professionals today. These
challenges are rooted in the increasing use of the internet by terror groups. The
paragraphs below overview the emergence of these threats.
Terrorism and the Use of Social Media
Communicating in spite of temporal and spatial barriers is crucial to the success
of terror organizations.174 Terrorists’ use of technology and media evolves along with
technological advancements. “Unless a terrorist group is ideologically opposed to
technology itself, it will generally use every available tool to do its work.”175 The
progression to the use of social media begins in the 1980s when terror organizations
began using both video technology to film propaganda films and advanced printing
techniques to produce color magazines for distribution. Distributions happened through
mail and within mosques around the world. Groups engaged the films or print materials,
discussing the implications of the materials together.176 Moving forward, groups began
producing sophisticated newsletters and magazines to distribute through email. Around
the same time, groups produced digital videos to be distributed through downloaded files
rather than DVD or VHS. By the 1990s, groups were engaging online chat rooms to
communicate. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, online message boards became
the primary networking platform for terror organizations.177 Online message board
forums followed a clear hierarchical organization. The threat organizer owned the forum
with the ability to add or delete users and content. Some threads were restricted to elite
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members of the organization who could “meet” via video conferencing to plan or
coordinate attacks.178 By 2009, terror supporters began using social media platforms.
Social media platforms (YouTube, Facebook, Twitter) created new opportunities
for terror groups and new issues for counterterrorism professionals. With social media,
terror groups could create new media without being at the control of media interpretation;
with social media, terror groups could communicate with publics via a direct channel.
While open source information (data depicting the use of social media by terror groups
and their potential supporters) was “generated at a speed and volume unprecedented in
the history of conflict,” questions concerning the validity, legality, and influence of this
social media use emerged. Social media platforms offered jihadists a simple interface
open to millions of users. Access to these platforms required limited internet access and
few products; terrorists could access social media platforms from nearly any location on
the globe, and because social media platforms are owned by private organizations,
suspending or deleting accounts associated with terror groups happened at a slow rate,
often as the result of much pressure.
Terrorists use social media for two purposes: (1) to attract new recruits and (2)
inspire lone wolf attacks.179 Prior to the emergence of social media use, terror recruiting
often occurred in person. With social media, jihadists could recruit without leaving their
physical location.180 J.M. Berger, Brookings Institute fellow on U.S. Relations with the
Islamic World, and Jonathon Morgan, technologist and data scientist for Brookings
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Institute, conducted research on the volume and reach of ISIS use of Twitter. Berger and
Morgan found that an estimated 46,000 pro-ISIS Twitter accounts were active in 2014.
Of these accounts, 6,216 were detected using bot or spam technology to tweet pro-ISIS
statements. This propaganda is used not only to recruit new followers, but to influence
lone wolf attacks resulting in the increase of domestic terrorism.
Terrorism and Lone Wolf Attacks
Since 2010, the FBI has declared lone wolf attacks as a significant threat to the
U.S. This realization is unique being that the Commission Report, written less than a
decade prior, has no mention of lone wolves. Finding a concrete statistic on lone wolf
attacks is difficult because the term itself is weighted. In the words of the Brookings
Institute, “it is the rare lone wolf who is truly alone.”181 Lone wolfs are described as “an
individual or small group of individuals who uses traditional terror tactics . . . but who
acts without membership in, or cooperation with, an official of unofficial terrorist
organization.”182 While lone wolf violence is not a new phenomenon, lone wolf attacks in
the United States and Europe have doubled in the past seven years.183 Typically, these
lone wolves find connection and validation through online interaction with terror groups.
The increase in lone wolfs directly correlates to the third current challenge facing the
counterterrorism professionals in the US, an increase in domestic terrorism.
Traditionally, lone wolfs were considered persons who commit violence without
any connections to a network or terror group. However, today’s lone wolf differs.
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Modern lone wolfs typically has some sort of contact with individuals associated with a
terror network, the degree of this contact varies by person and attacks. What is common
among lone wolves is the use of the internet. “Technology better enables a Lone Wolf
credo.”184 Connection to terror leaders, which formerly would only happen through direct
contact, can now take place through social media platforms. This connection allows terror
groups to disseminate their messages at a broader level and provide direction, support,
influence and training to suspected lone wolves. The evolution of terror groups has made
lone wolf terrorism the issue it is today.
While lone wolf terrorism is not new, the threat has evolved alongside new terror
tactics. Gregory Ehrie, FBI Special Agent in Charge of Intelligence at the New York
Field Office, explains:
ISIS represents a different style of terrorism. Al-Qaida and their affiliates are
still there. The threat from these groups has been mitigated but it is still there.
Those groups plan their attacks very carefully and they plan big attacks that
attract attention. The intelligence community understands how they operate. ISIS
is different. It is more like an autonomous collective where members are loosely
affiliated and they are more interested in throwing all sorts of punches, no matter
how small. It’s very difficult to mitigate that threat.185
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As intelligence improves, terror groups adapt to improve the strategies for planning and
carrying out attacks. For security professionals, the increase in lone wolf terrorism
presents unique challenges.
Lone wolfs recruited through social media present a demanding threat to security
professionals because these individuals can be recruited, communicate, and plan attacks
without leaving their home.186 Where traditional intelligence would target individuals
with a history of radical ideological tendencies, or ask nonviolent groups to identify
persons who may have radicalized, there are limited means for identifying lone wolfs
who solely use social media. Regarding lone wolf attacks, Ehrie explains that the time
frame from when a recruit decides to carry out violent attacks to the time in which the
attack takes place can be very short.187 Additionally, there exists no concrete profile for
lone wolfs. Security professionals have identified persons of all races, religious
affiliations, social-economic backgrounds, and cultures as lone wolf recruits.
Terrorists’ increasingly sophisticated use of social media as a channel for
propaganda and recruitment and the subsequent increase in lone wolf attacks presents a
multilayered threat to the U.S. As social media allows terrorists to coordinate and plan
violence without time and space limitations, the FBI has continued to call for increased
intelligence sharing and collaboration between the U.S. and foreign governments and for
resources to continue the engagement of “lawful investigative techniques . . . including
both physical and electronic surveillance.”188 While the Bureau continues to pursue
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methods for staying abreast of these current threats, the social media and lone wolf
challenge is demanding. The following paragraphs explore the opportunities and
limitations to addressing these challenges.
Emerging Questions: Communication Opportunities/Limitations
In his 2017 budget request to Congress, then FBI Director Comey stated,
“Countering ISIS’s social media use is a demanding task requiring delicate research.”
The reach and use of social media by terror organizations is more than simple
propaganda; “tampering with social networks is a form of social engineering.”189
Countering social media use by terrorists presents a complex problem. First, social media
platforms are protected legally from liability as internet service providers. Second, social
media offers an abundant open source resource for counterterrorism research wanting to
access data information depicting the use of social media by terrorists and their
supporters as well as data depicting the audience of such content.
As mentioned, social media platforms have experienced pressure by the public
and security professionals to suspend accounts thought to be supportive of terrorism.
While there is pressure to suspend and delete social media accounts associated with
terrorism, this may not be the best solution. While simply finding and suspending social
media accounts associated with terrorism propaganda can limit the distribution of proterror messages, questions regarding “how social radicalization works” and the
“unintended consequences” of simply deleting accounts demand attention.190 To address
the widespread and multilayered threat of social media use by terror groups, the FBI has
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acknowledged the following capabilities and resources as necessary for countering
current threats.
First, resources that allow for the collection and interpretation of data are needed.
These resources are often publicly shamed in connection to the increase in government
surveillance.191 Bureau leaders note:
We respect the right of people to engage in private communications, regardless
of the medium or technology. . .. Our aim is not to expand the government’s
surveillance authority, but rather to ensure that we can obtain electronic
information and evidence pursuant to the legal authority that Congress has
provided to keep America safe.192
Yet, as the sheer volume of social media use increases, and technological advances in
terms of encryption increases, FBI needs for collecting and interpreting data increase.
Presenting these needs in a way that is favorable for the public will continue to be a
challenged in the upcoming years.193
Second, new directions for the training and development of FBI intelligence
professionals and relationship building between the Bureau, local authorities, and
additional national security agencies are needed. Michael Steinbach, executive assistant
director of the FBI’s National Security Branch notes that responding to the challenge of

191

This comment is made in reference to social groups who protest against government surveillance as an
invasion of privacy and overstepping of civil rights.
192
Adapting to Defend the Homeland Against the Evolving International Terrorist Threat, Federal Bureau
of Investigation, Washington, D.C. (December 6, 2017) (statement of Nikki Flores, Deputy Assistant
Director of Counterterrorism Division). https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/adapting-to-defend-thehomeland-against-the-evolving-international-terrorist-threat.
193
Michael Steinbach, “How Technology Has Transformed the Terrorist Threat Fifteen Years After 9/11,”
Stein Counterterrorism Lecture Series, (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy), September 21,
2016. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/other/SteinbachStatement20160921ForDownload.pdf.

107

increased use of social media as a recruitment strategy for lone wolf terrorism begins
with providing security professionals with the right tools.194 Many of these tools include
data programs that can sift through online intelligence in place of human professionals.
However, apart from these digital tools, there needs to be a cultural shift within the
Bureau that demands rapid adaption to new threats. “Being adaptive also means looking
at how these complex organizations communicate and move . . .. We need to allow that
information sharing itself is complete and work with partners to develop robust systems
that take into account the type of information to be shared.”195 At the core of this new
training is innovation. Steinbach asks: how can we instill a culture of innovation among
Bureau employees? Innovation will drive counterterrorism measures in the next decade.
As we continue to confront the current challenges explored in this section, the
following questions will shape the FBI response:
1. How can the FBI work alongside with Social Media organizations to establish
principles and goals for reducing terror groups’ use of the platforms?
2. How can the FBI challenge the narrative used as propaganda by terror groups
online?
These questions currently demanding an FBI counterterrorism response address the
realities of an evolved terrorism threat amongst a mobile society where distances in space
and time are increasingly closed.
This section explored the current challenges that the FBI is facing in terms of
counterterrorism. While responding to these challenges, it is also imperative that leaders
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stay abreast of future threats. The final section of the chapter identifies and discusses
these upcoming threats.
Communication Ethics Context: Exploring Future Challenges
The final section of the chapter explores future challenges for the Bureau. As the
FBI’s goals have changed from persecuting past crimes to preventing future violence,
processes and procedures have focused on identifying and responding to future threats
before attacks can occurs. In the 2018 budget request to Congress, FBI leadership
acknowledged domestic terrorism, violence committed by homegrown terrorists aimed at
persons within the same country, as the primary future threat to security. The following
paragraphs overview this threat, as well as the necessary FBI developments required to
address it.
Domestic terrorism is broadly within the scope of counterterrorism measure of the
FBI. Domestic terrorists, as defined within a 2017 special Congressional report, are
“people who commit crimes within the homeland and draw inspiration from U.S.-based
extremist ideologies and movements. . .. These include individuals who commit crimes in
the name of ideologies supporting animal rights, environmental rights, anarchism, white
supremacy, anti-government ideals, black separatism, and beliefs about abortion.”196 Due
to the nature of the violence—which can differ sharply from traditional terrorism—
addressing domestic terrorism is a complicated issue. Since domestic terrorism includes a
multiplicity of ideologies, motives, and tactics, the first question to be addressed is what
is domestic terrorism? At a basic level, domestic terrorism is terrorism that occurs within
the United States. In addition to acting within the homeland, domestic terrorists “lack
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foreign direction.”197 While their actions may take influence from the type of violence
committed by foreign terrorists, there is no direct communication between domestic
terrorists and foreign terrorists. This distinction separates domestic terrorists from lone
wolf terrorists.
One place where these two issues are connected, however, is the influence of
traditional terror groups on domestic terrorists. Brian Michael Jenkins of the RAND
Corporation explains that jihadists are often born, raised, and recruited in the U.S.
Jenkins’s research finds that of the 178 terrorists who planned 86 terror attacks thwarted
by U.S. security agencies, and successfully carried out 22 attacks between 9/11/2001 and
December 2017, 86 were U.S. born.198 Jenkins’ research, intended to assist professionals
in developing protocols for vetting visitors to the U.S., assimilate immigrants and
refugees, and identify possible terror recruits within the U.S., finds that as pressure on
terror groups increased following 9/11, terror groups have increasingly focused on
inspiring domestic terrorists to launch domestic attacks. “The most economically
advanced, liberal democracies, including the United States, have also been the theaters of
domestic terrorism campaigns—in many cases, led by the most privileged members of
these societies.”199 These findings are supported by research showing that alongside
terror attacks planned and coordinated from outside the U.S. have been thwarted.
Yet, while there is separation between these two groups, policy against domestic
terrorism has largely been grouped alongside lone wolf terrorism. This is likely to change
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in the upcoming years as the FBI has listed domestic terrorism as a primary threat to
security. Since 9/11, efforts to prevent domestic terror attacks have increased. Laws in the
U.S. have expanded to allow prosecution “on the basis of intention alone,”200 and new
focused efforts have been coordinated to find solutions to home grown extremists. Yet,
these efforts focus solely on prevention and work under the premise that potentially
violent individuals can be identified by law enforcement. So far, the key response to
domestic terrorism is the coordinated Combatting Violent Extremism task force (CVE).
The Combatting Violent Extremism task force (CVE) began as a presidential
directive in 2011. The task force brought together security experts from the FBI,
Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). CVE was developed to address and implement the
strategic goals outlined by then President Barack Obama, in his August 2011, “National
Strategy for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United
States.” This plan outlined the role of local police forces, the FBI, and national security
agencies coordinated approach to preventing local terrorism.
The National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent
Extremism proposed that local community stakeholders—police forces, business owners,
citizens, and community leaders—were a beneficial asset to preventing extremism. The
local stakeholders are imperative to the fight against local lone wolf attacks because they
know their community and its members best. Speaking to the strategy, President Obama
noted the following:
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We rely on local, state, and Federal law enforcement to deter individuals from
suing violence and to protect communities from harm . . .. Countering
radicalization to violence is frequently best achieved by engaging and
empowering individuals and groups at the local level to build resilience against
violent extremism.201
The U.S. modeled this approach to countering violent extremism on previous successful
partnerships between local, federal, and national forces. Specifically, the task force was
modeled based on three initiatives.


Comprehensive Gang Model, an initiative to reduce and prevent gang activity
through social intervention and education. This initiative led by local community
forces with the support of the FBI succeeded in reducing gang related crimes in
high-crime cities throughout the U.S.



Building Communities of Trust Initiative, a coordinated effort between the
Department of Justice and Homeland Security to improve relationships between
local police forces and the communities they serve. The initiative successfully
developed lines of communication between the police and their community
members to address “information sharing, responding to community concerns,
and distinguishing between innocent cultural behaviors and conduct that may
legitimately reflect criminal activity or terrorism precursors.”202
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Safe Schools/Healthy Students Initiative (SS/HS). Launched by the Departments
of Education, Justice and Health and Human services, the SS/HS initiative
successfully reduced violence and substance abuse in American schools.

CVE was founded on the premise that “Although we have learned a great deal about
radicalization that leads to violence, we can never assume that the dynamics will remain
same.”203 Thus, research and communication between individuals, local government, and
national security agencies is imperative. This current strategy to counter domestic
terrorism is based upon three goals: “(1) enhancing engagement with and support to local
communities that may be targeted by violent extremists; (2) building government and law
enforcement expertise for preventing violent extremism; and (3) countering violent
extremists’ propaganda while promoting our ideals.”204
At the core of the CVE rests two primary objectives to be accomplished by the
FBI: open communication with local and national security forces and engagement with
the American public needs to increase awareness about domestic terrorism. President
Obama explained:
Engagement is essential for supporting community-based efforts to prevent
violent extremism because it allows government and communities to share
information, concerns, and potential solutions. Our aims in engaging with
communities to discuss violent extremism are to: (1) share sound, meaningful,
and timely information about the threat of violent extremism with a wide range of
community groups and organizations, particularly those involved in public safety
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issues; (2) respond to community concerns about government policies and
actions; and (3) better understand how we can effectively support communitybased solutions.205
For this engagement to be successful, the FBI must be cognizant of civil liberties while
increasing awareness amongst the public of domestic terrorism. This engagement
requires security professionals to take a “consultative approach” to community
prevention methods.206
These methods for countering domestic terrorism will continue to take shape over
the upcoming years. The following paragraph outlines the questions that will shape the
FBI’s counterterrorism response in the months and years to come.
Emerging Questions—Future Demands
As the FBI continues to respond to current threats, including the increased use of
social media and instances of lone wolf attacks, they will need to address the following
challenges emerging as a result of new threats:
1. How can the FBI build relationships with local community members and police
forces to better address domestic terrorism?
2. How can the FBI address domestic terrorism while showing that they do not wish
to overrun civil liberties?
While not yet fully developed, awareness concerning domestic terrorism begins with
increased engagement with the local communities who will be affected by this type of
terrorism.
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The questions identified in this section as past, present, and future concerns shape
the current communicative context of counterterrorism in this historical moment. These
questions demand continued response by security professionals, and these questions
situate the FBI as a significant organization in U.S. counterterrorism efforts. This section
identified and discussed upcoming challenges noted by the FBI. The ongoing sensing and
responding to upcoming threats will shape the future of the FBI and impact our
understanding of national security and counterterrorism in the decade to come. With
these questions in mind, the following paragraphs introduce a template for applying
communication-ethics-literacy-as-interpretive-lens in action.
Engaging the Communicative Context and Application
The previous pages presented the questions that shape counterterrorism in this
current moment. Understanding these emerging questions provides a basis for which one
can investigate the communication ethics response. Part two of this application uses
communication ethics metaphors to understand this communicative context in a manner
that provides better clarity and direction for future action. Part two of this application will
serve as the primary focus of application in the following chapter.
These emergent questions provide a list of current and future demands that the
FBI must consider while shaping their response to terrorism. These questions shape
federal counterterrorism response in this current historical moment:


How can imagination be an ongoing and necessary component of terrorism
prevention in order to preempt future capabilities, policy, and management
failures?
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How can the FBI adapt with future organizational responses and structural
changes as new threats emerge and current threats evolve?



How can the FBI work alongside with Social Media organizations to establish
principles and goals for reducing terror groups’ use of the platforms?



How can the FBI challenge the narrative used as propaganda by terror groups
online?



How can the FBI build relationships with local community members and police
forces to better address domestic terrorism?



How can the FBI address domestic terrorism while showing that they do not wish
to overrun civil liberties?

At the base of these emerging questions are the following issues: (1) building creativity
and imagination into counterterrorism training and practices; coordinating security
responses amongst multiple organizations; (2) challenging negative narratives including
those used as propaganda by terror groups and those used negatively against the FBI; and
(3) building local relationships with community groups in an effort to present a strong
and unified force against threats. These issues are primary communicative challenges
shaping our current and future responses to terrorism. Responding to these issues will
prove the FBI’s effectiveness in adapting to ongoing, current, and future threats.
As shown, one’s engagement with historical moments’ questions shape their
communicative practices and identity. As one confronts the issues that demand attention
in our current moment, they recognize that these questions are formed in response to
communicative events of the past, present, and future. Our communicative response,
then, is made with attentiveness beyond the given moment. This understanding of

116

historical moment frames this project’s application of communication ethics as
responsibility beyond the given moment, recognizing that decision made in current time
affect persons beyond a given special or temporal realm.
With knowledge of the communicative context of counterterrorism, this project
can begin to shape a response that addresses the challenges of terrorism with tools and
practices that are grounded in current context, capabilities, and limitations. Through the
lens of communication ethics, this application aims to offer practical next steps for
groups charged with responding to and countering terrorism. To apply communication
ethics literacy as lens in a way that attempts to identify (1) the emerging limitations to
practices and research; (2) existent touch points between these two areas of research; and
(3) hermeneutic openings for engagement, the remainder of this application begins with
connecting the communicative context of FBI counterterrorism with this work’s approach
to communication ethics to find the overt connections between theory and practice.
Where these connections between theory and practice exist, this work aims to craft
communicative practices that open and maintain spaces for creative responses to the
complex and ongoing challenge of terrorism.
With the communicative context of counterterrorism and list of significant
questions that shape FBI counterterrorism practices in this moment, the final chapter of
this project, and part two of this application section, will apply communication ethics
metaphors to seek clarity and direction regarding the past, present, and future challenges
of the FBI and counterterrorism. Attention to terrorism in this historical moments
requires that one makes sense of the threats we continue to face, while identifying the
current and future challenges that demand our response. Applying communication ethics
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metaphor to these identified challenges equips security professionals with tools for
remaining vigilant, relevant, and prepared for the future.
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Chapter 5: Communication Ethics Literacy as Lens: Responsiveness,
Imagination, and Creativity
This chapter concludes the communication ethics application in this project. Until this
point, this project has situated communication ethics as the protection and promotion of
communicative goods, acknowledging that in this historical moment, multiple goods exist
and compete for public recognition and space. Previous chapters have articulated the
importance of recognizing a given historical moment by identifying the emerging
questions that place an existential demand on the communicative agent. The literacy of
communication ethics, presented in this project through the metaphors of narrative,
communicative goods, historical moment, and attentiveness to multiplicity/difference,
frame this chapter’s application. The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate and discuss
how communication ethics literacy functions as an interpretive lens, and why this lens
affords communicators—and in this case, security professionals—a pragmatic capability
to respond to our moment’s demanding counterterrorism questions. Communicationethics-literacy-as-interpretive-lens infuses communicative events with ethical height and
weight.207 In moments where professionals are called to respond to ongoing, dynamic
challenges, communication ethics literacy provides tools for navigation.
Introduction
We begin this chapter where the previous chapter left us, with knowledge of the
communicative context of counterterrorism in this historical moment. Attentiveness to
historical moment reminds us that communicative contexts are intertwined with past
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findings, current events, and future demands; communication is embedded with the
muddiness of everyday life, which include the voices and experiences from the past,
present, and future sentiments.208 With this knowledge, we can connect communication
ethics metaphors. This project frames communication ethics metaphors beginning with
narrative as the communicative ground that houses the persons and stories that give rise
to communicative goods, which shape particular communicative practices. Narrative as a
communication ethics metaphor has overt connections to the FBI as an organization
charged with counterterrorism. Yet, navigating narrative in this era rich with diversity
and conflict is a difficult task. The hope of this chapter, then, is to show how engaging
narrative provides openings for creativity and imagination grounded on reflection.
Three sections shape this final application chapter. Section one, “Literacy and
Hypertextuality: The Limits of Application,” discusses the limits and opportunities of
communication ethics in a hypertextual moment. In reflection of research on the FBI and
counterterrorism as it has evolved since 9/11, this section frames application of
communication-ethics-literacy-as-interpretive-lens as resisting the assumption that one
can provide definite answers to the complex and dynamic questions that shape our world.
Section two, “Communication Ethics Literacy, Narrative, and Counterterrorism,”
provides overt connections between communication ethics metaphors and the questions
that shape and will continue to shape the communicative context of counterterrorism in
this historical moment. The purpose of this section is to situate communication ethics
literacy in a way that announces new insights and directions. This section leverages a
diverse body of communication ethics scholarship to (1) establish a connection between
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communication ethics and counterterrorism demands; and (2) situate a theoretically
textured approach to applying these metaphors in action. Section three, “Engaging
Communication Ethics Literacy in Action: Pragmatic Practices,” offers a list of
communicative practices for security professionals engaging counterterrorism amongst
hypertextuality. This section identifies a list of communicative practices that can be
engaged pragmatically to open the scope of counterterrorism research and action. In
conclusion, this chapter discusses the communicative practice of reflection as the
defining communicative task in predicting and responding to future threats.
Communication ethics literacy affords professionals a lens for exploring the
questions that shape counterterrorism. And while this application does not provide
answers for the demands that terrorism places on us in this historical moment, it provides
meaningful assistance for navigating these threats in a manner that does justice to the
diverse nation it seeks to protect. Equipped with such tools for navigation, it is the hope
of this project that creative ways for engaging security will emerge. Communication
ethics and counterterrorism in this moment presents us with the critical ethical demand
that characterizes this historical moment: our communicative response has no final
resolution.209 Navigating security in this moment requires that we recognize the limits of
reality—we may never achieve security in the objective sense; however, communication
ethics in this moment is shaped by our response to the challenges that call us. One can, in
the face of such reality, respond to security threats in a way that opens rather than limits
future possibilities for action.
Literacy and Hypertextuality: The Limits of Application
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This section discusses the application of communication-ethics-literacy-asinterpretive-lens as responsive to the hypertextual nature of this current moment.
Hypertextuality, understood in this project as the coexistence of commitments to multiple
historical eras, does not signify a time period following postmodernity. Rather,
hypertextuality recognizes that persons and organizations committed to a modern
commitment of process and procedure stand alongside persons committed to a
postmodern commitment to protect and promote difference. Hypertextuality is a
characterization of a postmodern world rich with diversity where agreements are
temporary, and conflict is complex. Acknowledging hypertextuality bounds this project’s
application of communication ethics literacy to limitations. These limitations are the
result of the inability to offer final solutions to the demands that terrorism places upon the
FBI and nation at large. Yet, understanding the application of communication ethics
literacy in a moment defined by hypertextuality offers space for practical and important
insights. The following paragraphs overviews the reality of applying communication
ethics literacy amongst hypertextuality.
Communication ethics in this moment acknowledges the coexistence of goods.
Attentiveness to the coexistence of goods recognizes that we live in a historical moment
that is rich with diversity of communicative agents; rich with diversity of communicative
goods; and, rich with diversity of communicative practices. This approach to
communication ethics rejects a modern assumption that a universal method of ethics
exists. More importantly, however, this approach to communication ethics is grounded in
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the acknowledgment of hypertextuality210—this is the understanding that ethics as the
commitment to the goods of multiple eras exist side by side.
Hypertextuality, defined by Umberto Eco and situated in communication ethics
scholarship by Arnett, is the recognition that varying approaches to communication
ethics—the protection and promotion of goods—exist concurrently in this historical
moment. Thus, persons committed to a modern prospect of processes and procedures live
and work alongside persons committed to a postmodern protection and promotion of
difference. Understanding this historical moment as hypertextual, one can acknowledge
that not only are there multiple, competing goods being protected and promoted, there is
also disagreement concerning how these goods should be protected through
communicative practices.
For this project, this acknowledgment of hypertextuality and the understanding of
communication ethics in this historical moment recognizes that there is no one publicly
agreed-upon set of communicative practices to protect and promote national security;
there is no one publicly agreed-upon way to navigate intelligence in a world riddled with
terrorism; there is no one publicly accepted and agreed upon manner in which we can
perform counterterrorism. Practices of counterterrorism are situated within particular
organizations who respond to the demands of the moment in a way that is both unique to
their defined communicative goods and interpretation of what matters. Embracing the
hypertextual nature of this moment means that communication ethics must be both
attentive to the why (the philosophical discernment of the good) and how (the
performative enactment of communication ethics) of communicative action.

210

Ronald C. Arnett, “Communicative Ethics: The Phenomenological Sense of Semioethics,” 81.

123

How we engage communication ethics in action matters. Our communicative
practices are made meaningful not only in contemplating which goods to protect and
promote, but in choosing a given communicative practice to accomplish this task. This
task of reclaiming communicative practices as a significant and vital component to
communication ethics literacy stands alongside Arnett in his work on hypertextuality.
Arnett writes that accepting our current historical moment as hypertextual “offers a
critical stance, challenging unreflective acceptance of process and procedure in a time of
global communication expansion.”211 It is the communicative obligation of each and
every person to engage their response to our moment’s demanding questions with
reflection, research, and, at times, critique of self and Other.
Communication-ethics-literacy-as-interpretive-lens attentive to hypertextuality
directs attention to the narrative structures that shape our own response and, concurrently,
varying narrative structures that shape the communicative practices of our research
subjects. For security professionals charged with the task of counterterrorism, this
twofold approach to intelligence collection, interpretation, and application opens areas for
new insights and directions—a task that was, is, and will continue to be the
communicative task of counterterrorism.
The purpose of this project’s application, then, is not to provide answers to the
questions that shape counterterrorism in this historical moment.212 Its approach to
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communication ethics resists the assumption that we can provide definite answers to the
complex and dynamic questions that shape our world. Rather, the hope of this application
is to offer theoretically grounded, practical tools for which security professionals can
engage issues of counterterrorism in a creative and insightful ways.
This response to this moment’s communicative context of counterterrorism
demands a recognition of monologue as a formative communicative ethics that underpins
this project’s presentation of narrative ground. Specifically, with the acknowledgment of
hypertextuality, this section notes the following realities, which will provide a backdrop
to this chapter as a whole:
1. When we recognize our historical moment as hypertextual, we recognize that
multiple narratives compete for public recognition and authority. In each
communicative space, there are limitations as to who/what speaks; what can be
heard; and what will be heard. Competition between and among groups
committed to competing communicative goods begins before the clashing of these
goods take place. This competition works to secure successfully the viability of
communicative space—be it physical spaces, technological spaces, or ideological
spaces.
2. Sense-making in this moment rests upon the ability to identify and interpret
multiple understandings of the good. The assumption that communicative actions
follows a path for interpretation that makes sense is an assumption void of the
complexities of this current moment. Communicative action need only make

and police forces to better address domestic terrorism? How can the FBI address domestic terrorism while
showing that they do not wish to overrun civil liberties?
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sense to those engaging in the communicative practice shaped by their narrative
ground. Navigating this difference is the communicative task of this moment.213
Utilizing communication ethics literacy as an interpretive lens for past, present, and
future engagement with acknowledgment of hypertextuality avoids critique or the
intention to replace systems with new structures for action. Communication ethics
literacy and hypertextuality allows one to view demands as historically complex and void
of simple solutions. At best, we can offer areas where we can add insight.
Offering practices that address the complexities of the moment without
overrunning reality, then, becomes a practical and pragmatic goal for this type of
application. With this insight, the following section begins to foreshadow this work’s
recommended practices by drawing overt connections between communication ethics
literacy metaphors and the FBI as an organization charged with the demanding task of
counterterrorism in a moment void of simplicity.
Communication Ethics Literacy, Narrative, and Counterterrorism
Equipped with an understanding of the current historical moment of
counterterrorism, this section identifies pragmatic connections between communication
ethics literacy and the FBI as an organization charged with counterterrorism.
Communication ethics assists counterterrorism professionals by providing an interpretive
lens through which security professionals can better identify the commitments,
motivators, and aims of terrorists. Whereas previous chapters reviewed communication
ethics literature and presented the dialogic approach to communication ethics that frames
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this project’s interpretive lens, this section integrates communication ethics literacy
metaphors into this project’s counterterrorism application. To that end, this section builds
upon the research previously presented to undergird the importance of narrative as the
ground that shapes us; our communicative ethic.
Communication ethics literacy is shaped by communicative metaphors that offer
researchers a lens for exploring current and ongoing challenges in a way that opens
boundaries for creative insight. In this project, communication ethics literacy is grounded
in the metaphors of narrative, communicative goods, and multiplicity/difference. This
project has framed our historical moment as it relates to counterterrorism by identifying
the former, current, and future terror threats demanding a response from the FBI. This
section explores these demands through the remaining communication ethics metaphors
to offer creative ways to explore these demands. This section, specifically, frames
connections between narrative—the stories, people, and practices which shape
communicative response—and the FBI.
Within the following paragraphs is an overview of this project’s communication
ethics metaphors alongside connections to the FBI. To navigate these connections, the
following paragraphs reference various communication ethics scholars. The aim of these
paragraphs is to offer practical areas where communication ethics literacy meets FBI
counterterrorism research gaps. Narrative guides this section. This project defines
narrative as the communicative ground that houses the stories, persons, communicative
goods, and communicative practices that shape communicative events and responses to
the demands of our historical moment. Narrative houses the communicative goods we
protect and promote; acknowledgment of our current moment as one void of narrative
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agreement shapes communication ethics literacy commitment to multiplicity and
difference. When we recognize our historical moment as hypertextual, we recognize that
multiple narratives compete for public recognition and authority.
Regarding communication ethics literacy, communicative goods and practices
derive meaning from particular narratives. Narrative ground houses one’s identity and
shapes one’s communicative practices.214 Citing the work of Charles Taylor, Arnett
writes that narrative shapes the monologue of one’s life. Without recognizing the
narrative ground of another, one can never understand how and why another makes the
decisions they do and performs communicative practices in a particular manner.
Additionally, predictions regarding future actions are groundless.215 Narratives are
negotiated and renegotiated over time as they adapt to the needs a given moment. Arnett,
Fritz, and Bell trace the roots of narrative in the discipline of communication to Walter
Fisher and W. Barnett Pearce. Following the work of Pearce, Fisher bridged
communication and narrative through rhetoric and argumentation.216 Fisher discusses the
importance of storytelling for human communication. Arnett, Fritz, and Bell bridge
storytelling and communication ethics literacy noting that publicly agreed upon stories
serve as narrative ground.217 The stories that shape our identity—narrative ground—
embed communicative goods and direct communicative practice. Like individuals,
organizations work within a given narrative. Organizational goals and practices should
align with their narrative ground upon.
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Narrative as persons, stories, and practices that shape individual communicative
ground are gathered around what would be called the good. Arnett reminds us that we
live in an era of narrative and virtue contention.218 This contention produces a
multiplicity of discourses that come to life in the public sphere as persons work to protect
and promote a variety of contrasting goods. Regarding communication ethics literacy, the
protection and promotion of communicative goods classifies communication ethics as
pragmatic. In each communicative event, persons perform the protection and promotion
of multiple goods. As noted in chapter three, two conceptions of goods exist. Substantial
goods are the identifiable position(s) that a communicator works to protect and promote.
Substantial goods are grounded in particular narratives and attentive to the needs of a
given historical moment. Communicative practices are the actions that protect and
promote the substantial goods.219 This understanding of communicative goods allows
communication ethics to be defined by the act of protecting and promoting goods through
performative communicative practices. As performative, communication ethics is both
practical and pragmatic; it responds to meet the demands that are everyday life.220
Acknowledging this moment as hypertextual requires that we understand competition
between communicative goods. Narrative and virtue contention results in competition
between and among goods for public space. No longer can one assume that a modern
framework of defined communicative goods shaping communicative practice exists.
Rather, there is a multiplicity of goods, perspectives, and practices within, among, and
behind each communicative event.
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Differences between and among persons and organizations drive disagreements
and conflict. Our current historical moment is one of vast disagreement concerning what
matters and what affords our attention and resources. Sense-making in this moment rests
on the ability to identify and interpret multiple understandings of the good. Navigating
this difference is the communicative task of this moment.221 Focusing our attention to the
demands that call us to respond in hopes of offering assistance without seeking final
resolution requires an attentiveness to the dynamic and diverse ethics present in each
communicative event.222
The application of communication ethics literacy to the questions that shape
counterterrorism in this moment rests on the above presentation of narrative as the
persons and stories which embed communicative goods and shape communicative
practice amongst multiplicity and difference. The following paragraphs identify overt
connections between these communication ethics metaphors and the FBI in order to offer
practical associations between these two areas.
Communication Ethics Literacy and FBI as Counterterrorism Organization
This subsection draws connections between the FBI and communication ethics
metaphors through the work of various communication ethics scholars. These
connections allow the reader to witness practical associations between this theoretically
rich literature and the FBI as a pragmatic organization charged with securing a diverse
nation.
The FBI works within the larger framework of national security organizations
within the U.S., but their narrative is specific to mission: “To protect the American
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people and uphold the Constitution of the United States.”223 As discussed in chapter two,
this mission is shaped by the stories in response to which the FBI responded and evolved.
At the heart of this mission is the origins of the FBI as a criminal investigation
organization, the transformation of the Bureau in response to the failures of 9/11, and the
current organization of the FBI in relation to emerging threats. The FBI’s narrative,
including the stories and person that shape this narrative over time, frame the
communicative goods they work to protect and promote. Yet, this narrative exists within
and among multiple narratives and, at times, must compete for dialogic space.
In addition to their own narrative, FBI analysts and agents find value in
acknowledging and researching the narratives of prospective terrorists. Without context
on the background of terror actions, analysts and agents can overlook future planning of
terror groups. With narrative background, researchers can better predict how and why
terrorist will make certain decisions. Research into the narratives of terror groups,
therefore, becomes a practical tool in aiding security professionals in the pursuit of
preventing future attacks. Coordinating efforts against future attacks requires information
that is grounded in intelligence. In terms of narrative, understanding the difference
between possible future threats versus impractical future threats is a distinction of
importance for security professionals. While the FBI does not seek to be in dialogue with
terror organizations, dialogue understood in this project as the meeting of different
narratives with an openness to learning, the FBI does compete against terror narratives
for physical, technological, and ideological space and authority. This competition is not
tied to overrunning terror narratives by imposing a single worldview. Rather, the FBI
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works to interrupt terror narratives in a way that reminds persons to hear multiple stories,
persons, and practices within a given space. At the center of this competition is an
acknowledgement that other groups and individuals are grounded upon narratives that
make sense from the standpoint of their own worldviews. Regarding terror groups, these
narratives are a national security threat. Even still, it becomes the effort of the
communicator to recognize these narratives as a valid source of communicative goods
and practices.
Our current historical moment demands that we take narrative seriously. To
assume that in this historical moment we can dismiss another’s narratives as invalid is a
fantasy assumption that disconnects our communicative action and tries to escape the
reality in which we live. Arnett articulates fantasy and communication ethics by
discussing Immanuel Kant’s distinction between imagination and fantasy tied to narrative
writing, “imagination is the faculty of making present that which is absent.”224
Imagination is rooted in the “persons, stories, and ideas” that validate a particular
narrative. In contrast to fantasy, imagination is confirmed through research tied to a given
narrative. Fantasy, on the other hand, is not connected to a real ground. Unlike
imagination, which begins with acknowledgement of narrative ground, fantasy is based
only on optimism.225 Arnett and Pat Arneson explain that optimism is a naive
engagement of current issues and demands that overlooks the challenges that shape our
lives. Communicative practice based on optimism does not engage the realities of our
current moment as hypertextual. In comparison, imagination as attentiveness to narrative
ground fuels genuine hope for communicative responses. This hope acknowledges the
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real-time demands, as difficult, demanding, and challenging as they may be, in an effort
to respond in a way that offers solid implications for future engagement.226
For counterterrorism professionals, imagination tied to narrative is dependent on
research that is attentive to the background motivators, resources, and capabilities of
terror groups or individuals. For example, it would be fantastical to assume that terror
resources are limited or unchanging. Security professionals charged with predicating
future terror trends must stay on the forefront of intelligence, being ever attentive to
change. Additionally, for federal counterterrorism practices, imagination offers avenues
for creative insight. Regarding the recommendations made by the Commission for the
FBI—brainstorm about how attacks may be carried out; identify telltale indications that a
surprise attack is being planned; collect intelligence on the indicators when possible; and
integrate defense mechanisms to stop or alert to the deadliest attacks227—beginning these
tasks with attentiveness to narrative ground will fuel imagination. Expanding research
beyond the foreground to discover the background persons, stories, events, and ideas that
may shape future communicative action can open doorways for new areas of exploration.
Attentiveness to narrative ground as a gateway to increased awareness and
intelligence opens pathways for identifying the communicative goods competing for
viability in this moment. The FBI currently has an established and vetted set of
communicative goods that claim significance in their day to day work. These goods
emerge through the set of priorities that guide the action of security professionals. These
communicative goods also shift as old threats decrease or evolve and new threats emerge.
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Currently, the FBI works to protect and promote prevention of terror attacks against the
U.S., prevent foreign intelligence and espionage, and detect cyber-attacks against the
U.S. and public corruption.228 For counterterrorism, the FBI privileges the prevention of
terror attacks on U.S. soil. Within this communicative good are smaller communicative
goods that shape FBI professional’s communicative practices. These communicative
goods are, as identified in the previous chapter, as follows: counter social media
recruiting and propaganda by terrorists, prevent lone wolf attacks, and combat
homegrown violent extremism. The FBI navigates the protection and promotion of these
goods amongst multiple goods competing for viability in public space. These goods
compete not only against those who support terrorism as an indiscriminate tool of
violence and communication, but with those who challenge the communitive practices of
counterterrorism professionals. For instance, public outcry against intelligence as an
oversight of privacy continues to shape conversations surrounding the FBI and
counterterrorism.229
This project’s approach to communication ethics assumes that even if agreement
regarding the communicative goods exists, how to protect and promote this good can be a
point of contention between and among persons. Solution-based practices impose a
fantasy ideal that shifts attention away from the reality of multiple perspectives of the
good toward imposed demands regarding what matters and what actions should be
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taken.230 This approach to communication ethics as universal commitment to a singular
set of goods disregards the recognition that within each communicative event past stories,
current persons, and future directions shape our demands. For the FBI, this project’s
approach to communicative goods requires that one work without assurance of a solution.
Additionally, for security professionals, acknowledging that current conflicts and
threats are shaped by a diverse background of multiple and competing communicative
goods helps to frame foreground threats as textured. Research into the various narratives
of terror actors can provide insight into the goods they protect and promote. Recognizing
terrorists as individuals acting to protect and promote a set of communicative goods
defined by their given narrative opens the communicative why and how of
communicative action. Arnett, Leeanne Bell McManus, and Amanda McKendree offer
insight into communicative goods and conflict that provide additional support here.
Conflict and violence in the present is the result of conflicting background goods. These
authors explain that communicative actors promote and promote their representative
communicative goods in each communicative event. This protection and promotion in the
foreground makes communication ethics pragmatic. Acknowledging the background
goods of others provides clarity into the why and how of their communicative practices.
Research into the background motivators of communicative actors textures the analysis
of foreground communicative events. This textured approach to conflict illuminates the
foreground events in a way that offers new insights for analysts. Looking beyond present
actions to identify the underlying goods allows us to see why actors are making the
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decisions being made. This looking beyond offers professionals a critical approach for
making sense of terror actions that read as inexcusable and incomprehensible.
Discernment of communicative goods with recognition that solution-based
practices overlook the significance of multiplicity and difference in this moment opens
the conversation for navigating conflicts in a way that is creative and insightful. For
security professionals, understanding the background motivators of varying security
organizations as well as the background motivations of terrorists can broaden the scope
of action. As discussed, it is imperative that the FBI build and maintain relationships with
local partners to prevent violent extremism. Finding the touch points between and among
the multiple security organizations can assist the FBI is bridging and maintaining key
relationships with organizations charged with similar tasks. This relationship building
among multiple constituencies can account for a better dispersing of valuable resources.
Each organization protects and promotes their interpretation of a given good. Thus, while
aims may be singular, interpretations and practices are multiple. François Cooren
expands on this meeting of difference between and among communicators in this given
historical moment. Cooren notes that within every communicative event there are actions
that can be observed and analyzed. However, behind these actions is an organizing
structure that governs communicative practices.
Negotiation between persons, therefore, is not limited to the communicative
event. Each actor in communication speaks and acts on behalf of their given organization.
When these background organizations are acknowledged, we free communicative events
from the present and open the possibility of future interactions between and among
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organizations.231 For resource allocation, those proposition resources can add weight to
their claim by acknowledging the organizations, broadly, that give them the authority to
make such claims. At the core of U.S. security is a coordinated effort that transcends each
individual organization. Being attentive to communication ethics literacy in action
requires that communicative agents practice due diligence in reflection and learning. This
due diligence provides a backdrop of information that assists in navigating the diverse
backdrop of communicative events. Recognition of this historical moment as
hypertextual requires that one recognize the coexistence of competing narratives. This
recognition resists an attempt to overrun reality with a commitment to process and
procedure.
With these connections, the following subsection offers a set of communicative
practices for practically engaging counterterrorism is a way that acknowledges the limits
of our moment while opening avenues for creative insight. These practices offer security
professionals a pragmatic first step for navigating terrorism and its demands amongst
uncertainty.
Communication Ethics Literacy as Practice
Exploring counterterrorism and the FBI through the communication ethics
metaphors of narrative, communicative goods, and multiplicity/difference allows us to
draw overt connections between these two areas. These connections open space for
exploration that is not limited to the conflict of the current moment; interpreting with
these metaphors broadens the scope of research allowing professionals to see the
textured, varied, and demanding reality of the threats we continue to face. These
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connections show that (1) all persons and organizations work from narrative grounds.
These narrative grounds are formed from past stories, persons, and practices recognized
as valid sources of meaning amongst a group of individuals. (2) Communicative goods
compete for public viability in each communicative event. Competition of these goods
can stem from differences concerning what matters. Competition can also be fueled by
disagreements regarding choice of communicative practice for defending such goods.
Thus, two persons committed to the same good can disagree on the best approach to
promoting the good. (3) Multiplicity and difference makes sense-making a temporary and
difficult task. Looking beyond the current practices to see that each moment is full of
various governing structures that shape communicative actors can create new spaces for
insight.
Drawing overt, yet practical, connections between communication ethics literacy
and the FBI’s counterterrorism efforts identifies the following insights:
1. Attentiveness to narrative ground provides an interpretive gateway to increased
awareness and intelligence. This gateway opens pathways for identifying the
communicative goods competing for viability in this moment. With this
knowledge, security professionals free communicative events from present
demands to explore the future possibilities of threats and action.
2. Acknowledgement of communicative goods as competing for public recognition
and public space allows professionals to understand the limitations of solutionbased practices. Solution-based practices impose a fantasy ideal that shifts
attention away from the reality of multiple perspectives of the good toward
imposed demands regarding what matters and what actions should be taken.
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Attentiveness toward practical response in place of solution-based practices opens
the conversation for navigating conflicts in a way that is creative and insightful.
3. Acknowledging the complex and diverse nature of relationships between persons
and organizations affords security professional the ability to transcend
organizational constraints in a way that does not dismiss the realities of the
current moment and to work in a coordinated fashion for increased intelligence.
This attentiveness to diversity provides a backdrop of information that assists in
navigating the diverse backdrop of communicative events.
Attentiveness to communication ethics literacy in action shifts the focus of attention from
limits and constraints to openings for future thought and action. The above insights
provide a pathway for developing thoughtful and attentive communicative practices that
assist navigation of counterterrorism in our historical moment.
This section provided overt connections between communication ethics literacy
and the FBI as a counterterrorism organization in an effort to connect the theory and
practice. The next section explores communicative insights to offer practical assistance
for performing this theory in action in a way that opens creativity and hope for future
directions.
Engaging Communication Ethics Literacy in Action: Interpreting Effective Practices
This section begins with the following acknowledgement made in reflection of the
work of Arnett: hope and creativity live where assurance does not. They live in
acknowledgment and response to the demands that shape a moment. This response, when
made with attentiveness to the literacy of communication ethics offers avenues for
discovery. Reflecting on this sentiment, this section asks, how do we attend to narrative,
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goods, and multiplicity in a way that permits us to engage in the demands of our current
moment? With insights from the connections between communication ethics literacy and
FBI counterterrorism made in section one, this section identifies a set of communicative
practices that respond to the questions shaping counterterrorism in this moment: How can
imagination be an ongoing and necessary component of terrorism prevention in order to
preempt future capabilities, policy, and management failures? How can the FBI adapt
with future organizational responses and structural changes as new threats emerge and
current threats evolve? How can the FBI work alongside with Social Media organizations
to establish principles and goals for reducing terror groups’ use of the platforms? How
can the FBI challenge the narrative used as propaganda by terror groups online? How can
the FBI build relationships with local community members and police forces to better
address domestic terrorism? How can the FBI address domestic terrorism while showing
that they do not wish to overrun civil liberties?
This project approaches these questions not with optimism for final solutions, but
with hope for creative insight and direction. This assertion recognizes that, at times, we
must endure the muddiness of life in search of areas that can provide genuine hope for
navigation. Following the insights of Arendt, Arnett explain this task as it relates to
communication ethics: “genuine light” counters “undue optimism” that promises an
escape from the dangers of fear and uncertainty.232 In this moment, those attentive to
communication ethics literacy recognize that terrorism resists a final solution as national
security evolves and changes over time.
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Identifying Gaps for Reflective Practices
I begin this section by reviewing the FBI process for gathering, analyzing, and
disseminating intelligence. The FBI, among other security organizations within the U.S.,
define intelligence as (1) a product of refined research that assists policymakers in
decision-making; (2) a process by which information is gathered, refined, and
disseminated; and (3) organizations charged with refining raw data into useful research
for the security community at large.233 This project has shown that September 11 exposed
specific gaps in security intelligence. Previous chapters presented 9/11 as a significant
story shaping our narrative of national security noting that stories guide one’s
engagement with the historical moment and offer appropriate grounds for responding to
current existential demands. The failures of 9/11 continue to shape our response the
demands of our current moment. Thinking about these failures alongside the current
process for intelligence will uncover practices for creatively navigating counterterrorism.
Intelligence gathering and dissemination works in a cycle consisting of six
processes. First, intelligence officers analyze pressing threats identified by FBI
leadership. The threats provide areas to focus intelligence gathering efforts and identify
specific subjects for research. Second, an implementation plan for data collection,
refinement, and dissemination is developed. Third, raw information is gathered through
sources identified during the implementation period. These sources include information
collected from human sources, or persons of interest, through interviews or covert
operations, signals intelligence from electronic transmissions, photo intelligence gathered
through satellites, measurement and signatures intelligence gathered through raw data
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concerning weapon capability tests, and open source intelligence from public sources
including media, academic sources, and public data. Fourth, raw data is converted into
analysis. Fifth, data is converted into intelligence, and “information’s reliability, validity,
and relevance is evaluated and weighed.”234 Intelligence personnel then draw conclusions
regarding implications of the data. Finally, this intelligence is distributed in three formats:
Intelligence Information Report (IIrs), FBI Intelligence Bulletins, and FBI Intelligence
Assessments.
In each step of intelligence, FBI personnel are attentive to the line between data
collection, analysis, and dissemination and civil liberties. To that end, the Bureau works
within laws defined by the U.S. Constitution and follows guidelines directed by U.S.
Attorney General. Additionally, all new intelligence personnel visit the U.S. Holocaust
Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C. “to see for themselves what can happen when
law enforcement becomes a tool of oppression.”235 This trip is planned in an effort to
remind FBI personnel to be attentive to the dangers of oppressing publics in the attempt
to secure intelligence. FBI policy is to share intelligence when possible with other
security groups in order to protect against threats to the U.S. or law enforcement.
Viewing the intelligence distribution process through the lens of communication
ethics literacy, one can identify areas for applying communicative practice. To begin, it
must be acknowledged that the FBI works within a modern framework of documented
processes and procedures, committed to one understanding of the good—protecting the
U.S. from violence. Therefore, to assume that we could overhaul all of these processes
would also be a fantasy. The best we can do is identify practices that create areas for
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insight and creative action, thus opening the processes and procedures in a way that
pushes the boundaries of informational constraints.
Taking the identified failures as a starting point, we can see that the greatest
issues regarding intelligence gathering analysis and dissemination center upon the
following constraints: instituting imagination, relationship building, and challenging and
responding to dangerous narratives. This project argues that instituting imagination is
central to the constraints outlined here. These constraints limit the possible for creative
engagement of counterterrorism, and, when grounded in fantastical assumptions of
solution-based practices, create further security gaps. Interpreting these constraints with
insights from communication ethics affords professionals the ability to see limitations as
a communicative practice worthy of implementation.
Integrating imagination within the intelligence process grounds this section’s
recommended communication. This project understands imagination “as the faculty of
making present that which is absent.”236 Imagination begins with attentiveness to
others—as unacceptable and incomprehensible as they may be when viewed through our
worldview. Echoing the sentiment of Hannah Arendt and her work on Immanuel Kant,
Arnett writes that imagination works with two faculties for knowledge, sensing and
knowing. Imagination offers an alternative to progress, or the effort to overrun reality
with the hope of instituting processes and procedures that fix our demands. In place of a
commitment to process and procedures that ignores the reality of difference and the
demands of the particular moment, imagination offers the scope to explore demands
without subjective demand that they conform to our own wishes. Building imagination
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into the intelligence process begins with reflective practices that change the way security
professionals think about the goals of intelligence.
Currently, each step in the intelligence process is aimed at a particular goal:
identifying research subjects, detailing raw data collection plans, gathering data,
analyzing data, producing reports for audiences in charge of decision making. Within this
process, the goal is defined at the beginning of the process when FBI leadership
establishes the research subjects. From there, intelligence work is aimed at data collection
and analysis for the goal of producing reports that provide clarity on the research subject.
This process, when interpreted through the lens of communication ethics literacy, calls us
to attend to reflection as a means of identifying and informing research gaps. Reflection
practices offer professionals a ground for integrating imagination.
Integrating Reflective Practices
This project offers the following reflective practices as a means to improving
intelligence in a hypertextual moment defined by the demands of terrorism. These
practices remind professionals to revisit past practices with a lens for uncovering where
and why gaps existed. With this knowledge, professionals can brace for events with
insight and clarity. In this moment where solution-based practices are not an attainable
reality and the demands of terrorism are ongoing, reflective practices offer a space for
learning and adapting in real-time. The following communicative practices offer strategic
initiative for engaging reflective practices so as to address the documented FBI
counterterrorism failures listed throughout this project:
1. Implement reflective practices—Reflective practices work by looking back on
communicative events with metaphors that afford professionals an intellectual
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space for sense-making. This intellectual space offers professionals the ability to
identify gaps, breakdowns in process and procedure, and critical moments where
failures emerged. Reflections on 9/11 show that, in theory, the FBI had allotted
resources for counterterrorism to local field offices. In practice, however, these
resources were minimal. Additionally, as witnessed with the FBI’s Countering
Violent Extremism (CVE) initiative established in 2011, and discussed in
previous chapters, while groundwork was laid for implementing practices to
detect violent extremism, the processes were underdeveloped in practice. When
we explore counterterrorism demands and actions through communication ethics
literacy, we acknowledge the need for better attentiveness to integrated theory and
practice.
Following the insights of Calvin O. Schrag, praxis addresses the interplay
of theory, action, and context.237 This interplay recognizes the importance of
each—theory, action, and context—without privileging one above the others.
Communicative praxis reminds us that while we cannot rely simply on the
presentation of data, we also cannot rely on theory left underdeveloped and not
implemented. Continuous reflection requires that we ask: is the theory for
implementation developed? Are the practices that bring this theory into action
defined? Are these practices practical for this given moment and context?
Reflecting upon these questions in all stages of implementation allow one to see
gaps in intelligence as they emerge and gaps in practice as they unfold. The
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complexity of this historical moment requires that professionals acknowledge that
gaps and missed opportunities will occur. Reflective practice reminds us that
amongst mistakes, professionals have an obligation to go back and interpret these
failures in an effort to improve and resist repetition.
2. Texture reflective practices. Strategic relationships with local community
organizations provide multiple resources for vetting counterterrorism practices. In
addition to intellectual space afforded through one’s own reflective practices, the
coordination of groups and persons provides a textured approach to examine
practices with the goal of identifying and closing gaps. The FBI depends on their
ability to build strategic relationships with attentiveness to multiplicity and
organizational constraints. These relationships allow for intelligence sharing that
can provide early detection of individuals who may engage in violent extremism.
Care in attentiveness to the interplay of multiple goods in public space can help to
foster and maintain these strategic and necessary relationships. If we look to the
joint CVE initiative of the Obama administration and FBI as an example, we can
witness how inattentiveness to the multiplicity of goods can limit the growth of
relationships and trust amongst local groups and the FBI. Attentiveness to the
multiplicity and organizational restraints begins with recognition that all
communicative events are shaped by multiple governing structures. This
acknowledgment requires that security professionals ask: What goods drive this
organization’s commitments to security? What practices protect and promote
these goods? How do these practices compete with the goods of the FBI?
Attentiveness to these questions can allow professionals seeking to build
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quality relationships with insight on the best means of resource allocation.
Allocating resources to the strategic areas where local communities need them
offers a pragmatic space for bridging gaps amongst local and federal
counterterrorism efforts. Strong relationships build resources and afford
professionals a strong capacity for reflective practices.
3. Enhance reflective practices—Interpreting narrative ground as monologue allots
professionals the ability to augment reflective practices further. The FBI works to
counter terror narratives online while also navigating criticisms against their
intelligence processes. Similar to how the FBI depends on relationships with local
groups to strengthen the ability to identify individuals who may commit violence,
the FBI relies on tips from citizens to identify possible terror actors. As such, it is
important for the Bureau to have measures in place to respond to counter
dangerous narratives online and, when needed, understand public criticisms that
may deter individuals from sharing pertinent information regarding terror threats.
“The notion of common sense shifts from expected uniform universal access to a
pragmatic existential humility that acknowledge[s] biased and tainted ground a
particular narrative position.”238 In our current moment, narratives compete for
“conceptual or discourse space.”239 Embeddedness in a given narrative shapes
possibilities for communication as narratives encounter one another in dialogue.
We can no longer assume that persons work within a narrative framework
that make sense to us; truth and common sense are no longer tied first to
worldview. Rather, truth and common sense are situated in narrative which shapes
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multiple worldview perspectives. We cannot counter the worldview of another
without recognition of the fact that the persons, stories, communicative goods,
and practices embedded in these narratives reinforce their worldview as a
common sense truth. In a hypertextual moment, sense-making is grounded in a
particular worldview shaped by a given narrative. Countering opposing
worldviews from the standpoint of one’s own narrative is not effective. The
communicative practice for addressing dangerous narratives becomes one of
showing fault in the ground of particular narratives rather than critiquing from
one’s own narrative. Additionally, asking oneself where the roots of criticism
stem from and responding in a way that takes seriously the criticisms of the public
upon which professionals depend. Monologue offers a source of understanding
and countering other dangerous monologues.
Literacy as interpretive lens protects and promotes reflective communicative practices.
Reflective practices shape practical and pragmatic measures for FBI counterterrorism
professionals to work within the processes and procedures defined by the Bureau, while
working to expand limitations and identify gaps and opportunities for intelligence
professionals. Additionally, reflective practices create opportunities from which
imagination and creativity can grow. This ground upon which imagination and creativity
can stand is built on genuine hope attentive to the past concerns, current demands, and
future threats that shape our moment.
This application of communication-ethics-literacy-as-interpretive-lens shows that
navigating counterterrorism in a hypertextual moment is an unending task of reflection.
Literacy as interpretive lens amongst hypertextuality shows that strategic communicative
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practices open spaces for response rather than overrunning the realities of our moment or
oversimplifying the demands of counterterrorism. Literacy as interpretive lens affords us
practical means for engaging this moments critical questions in a manner that does justice
to the diverse nation it seeks to protect.
This work’s applications place reflective practices as the practical and pragmatic
communicative good of interpretation using communication ethics literacy. This project’s
presentation of communication ethics as interpretive lens transforms the application of
communication ethics metaphors application from a tool applicable to understanding past
events to a practical and important measure for navigating current and future demands.
This transformation rests upon one’s ability to infuse imagination rooted in reflective
practices into the most difficult of demands and limitations. Communication-ethicsliteracy-as-interpretive-lens equips security professionals with meaningful strategies for
engaging the demands of our moment even when these moments seem to paralyze space
for action. Reflective practices keep communicative life and communicative action alive
in the face of danger and violence committed to paralyzing groups with fear. With this
sentiment, this project concludes with commentary on the implications of connecting
communication ethics with FBI counterterrorism.
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Concluding Remarks: Communication Ethics as The Protection and Promotion of
Precarious Life
This project began noting Bruce Hoffman’s seminal work of terrorism, writing,
terrorism is the nondiscriminatory use of violence to impose fear in hopes of changing
political landscapes or promoting specific ideologies; terrorism is most successful when
thought translates into action or, when plans for violence are successfully carried out.
Following insights from the previous five chapters, this project extends this definition of
successful terrorism to add that terrorism is most successful when it, through fear and
violence, paralyzes a given community or group of persons making it difficult, if not
impossible, to respond. Thus, the most successful terrorists are those who translate
thought into an Other’s inaction. In summary, terrorism exploits the freedoms it seeks to
replace in hopes of making one incommunicable.240
Judith Butler, Maxine Elliot professor of comparative literature at the University
of California, Berkeley, speaks of this motive of removing one’s ability to respond in her
work of the precarious nature of social life. Butler’s work on performativity as a
communicative act of resistance and reliance offers implications for continued research,
development, and application of communication ethics literacy and counterterrorism.241
This final section explores the implications of Butler’s work on this project and the future
of counterterrorism and communication ethics scholarship.
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Terrorism presents us with an unending call of communication ethics; respond.
The ability to navigate life amongst the perils of violence depends on one’s ability to
prepare, reflect, and respond to the demands and questions that shape a given moment.
This call to respond, specifically in the face of violence, is not a call one can avoid or
control. In her work on the ethics of discourse, Butler explains: “No one controls the
terms by which one is addressed . . .. To be addressed is to be, from the start, deprived of
will, and to have deprivation exist as the basis of one’s situation in discourse.”242 Butler’s
words echo the sentiment of this project: terrorism in all its forms (domestic,
international, lone wolf), with its multiple motivations, theories, and actions, demand of
us a response while aiming to close our ability to respond in any meaningful way. Thus,
our responses are often made in darkness as it is impossible to know for certain if our
efforts will deter or impact the capabilities of terrorist in any measurably successful
manner.
Terrorism confronts us with violence that is “beyond our will” and imposes upon
professionals the obligation to navigate such dreadful conditions. How and why we
choose to respond to this reality is the defining communicative ethical choice of this time.
The benefit of Butler’s work for this project is found in her approach to the precarious
nature of social life as the bonds that create and sustain one’s ability to respond; the
bonds that keep one afloat in the face of violence. Butler’s work on precarity and
performativity offer a constant reminder that our ability to communicate and act is, at its
core, a life-granting and life-sustaining function of human capacity. Amongst oppression
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and violence, finding ways to sustain the ability to communicate is, at times, our greatest
success. The paragraphs below offer remarks on the implications of Butler’s sentiments
for this project and the future of counterterrorism responses.
Butler situates precarity as a human condition of life lived with others.243 By
nature, human life is precarious on the basis of social interdependence; simply put, we
cannot determine who we share our world with, and, as a result of this indeterminism, our
lives are precarious and full of uncertainty. Additionally, efforts to exploit this precarious
nature of social life create or subdue additional precarious factors. For instance, precarity
becomes tied to the body as employment, food security, housing security, and security
against violence is threatened or alleviated based on persons, institutions, and structures
that govern public life.244 Thus, sources and conditions of precarity are multiple and
reducing the source or solution of precarity to singular efforts overlooks the significance
of social interdependency. Terrorism exploits this uncertainty leveraging violence,
propaganda, and fear to drive disconnects between persons, communities, and countries.
The precarious nature of social life lived amongst Others acknowledges the fate of
terrorism in this moment: No one escapes the threat of such violence as we cannot
objectify and achieve security across all areas of life. There is no easy way to foster
sustainable solutions to precarious cohabitation.245 At times, our best hope of responding
to this uncertainty is to limit the harm created by our responses and to endure challenges
in a way that keeps imagination open. Where terrorism succeeds is in the exploitation of
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this precarious social interdependence with the use of violence, it is our response that
ultimately determines this success. There are communicative events which can be
overwhelming and in effect, cause the constraints of our reality to “paralyze” one to
inaction.246 The question when confronted with the weight of such ethical burdens
becomes: how does one carry the existence of such responsibility?247 Following the
insights of Butler, I argue that we communicatively challenge this ethical paralysis
through reflective practices create and sustain a ground for imagination that carries
creative outlets for unending response.
Writing in reflection of the work of Emmanuel Levinas, who reminds us that we
are called to ethical response through a demand that comes often against our will, Butler
notes that the call to respond in such dire conditions holds us hostage and situates us in a
realm of unending responsibility.248 The ground for ethics rests where assurance does not.
“If I possess myself too firmly or too rigidly, I cannot be in an ethical relation.”249 At the
core of Butler’s work on precarity is the sentiment that we cannot chose with whom we
cohabit the world. The only choice one has is the choice to respond to the demands that
shape our time as violent, challenging, and unending as they are. The ability to
unparalyze oneself is to not only acknowledge the ethical demand placed upon us, but to
acknowledge the call as unending. Every time we reflect on the gaps in our intelligence,
every time we reflect on the failures and mistakes of our processes, and every time we
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reflect on the future state of unending security demands, we affirm the basis of ethics.
Only in acknowledgment of darkness can we create the possibility for genuine hope of
communicative action.
Whereas terrorism attempts to abuse or exploit precarity by staking a claim as to
whose lives matter, our continued reflection and response can open pathways for
imagination. Each time professionals commit themselves to the preservation of life and
reflect on the demands of terrorism, we create pathways for imagination. And with this,
we unparalyze ourselves from terror and keep alive the possibility for genuine hope.
Through continued reflection, we do not simply endure violence and fear, we offer
avenues for forecasting future predictions. It is in this forecasting that sincere
contributions will be made. This forecasting offers a continuous reminder that our ethical
demands are not simply to those in present eyesight. We cannot avoid the precarious
nature of our lives, but we can reflect and respond to give life to genuine outlets and
creative hope for future engagements.
When tasked with the burden of response in the face of fear and, at times, failure,
reflective practices provide us with a ground off of which to push. We do ourselves a
disservice by attempting to seek short-term answers that overlook the complexities of the
moment place answers on a ground of optimism fueled only by fantasy. In our exposure
to forces beyond our control and to the fear and violence perpetuated by terrorists in an
attempt to rob us of ability to act, our persistence of reflective practices performs a
continued message of “we are here” which, in turn, translates into a “we have not yet
been disposed of.”250 This thereness asserts our ability to challenge terrorism on
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imaginative ground that keeps alive hope for future guidance and genuine social change.
In the face of terrorism as a continued threat to safety, keeping alive the ability to respond
through reflection is the primary good.
With response, made through an attentiveness to continued reflective practices,
one moves past the hope for universal response toward the mud of everyday life,
recognizing that the answers to our current communicative issues are not simple.251 Yet,
acknowledgement of narrative ground makes future direction possible. This future
direction, built on creativity and imagination sustains real development for practically
meeting the demands of terrorism in the years to come.
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